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RESTORING REASONABLENESS TO WORKPLACE
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
Dallan F. Flake*
Abstract: When Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1972 to require
employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious practices absent undue hardship
to their business, it intended to protect employees from being forced to choose between their
jobs and their religious beliefs. Yet in the decades since, courts have cut away at this right to
the point it is practically nonexistent. Particularly concerning is the growing tendency of courts
to read reasonableness out of the accommodation requirement, either by conflating
reasonableness and undue hardship so that an accommodation’s reasonableness depends solely
on whether it would cause the employer undue hardship, by setting the bar for reasonableness
so low it is practically meaningless, or by ignoring the requirement altogether. Consequently,
employers today have near carte blanche over whether and how to provide religious
accommodations—a power imbalance that often forces employees into the precise dilemma
from which Congress sought to protect them.
This Article argues for the restoration of employees’ right to reasonable religious
accommodations. It does so by asserting that reasonableness under Title VII is a standalone
requirement, separate and distinct from undue hardship, that must be evaluated from the
employee’s perspective. An accommodation should be deemed reasonable to the employee
only if it (1) fully eliminates the conflict between the employee’s job and religion, (2) does not
cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) avoids unnecessarily
disadvantaging the employee’s terms or conditions of employment. This conceptualization of
reasonableness aligns with Congress’s intent and, if adopted, would help level the playing field
between employers and employees in this increasingly critical area of law.
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INTRODUCTION
When Jerome Christmon asked B&B Airparts to accommodate his
Hebrew Israelite faith by allowing him to work his mandatory overtime
shifts on Sundays instead of Saturdays, his employer refused.1 With no
other option, Christmon stopped showing up for his Saturday shifts so he
could observe his Sabbath.2 Although B&B refrained from firing him for
his absences, Christmon felt deeply dissatisfied with this arrangement
because it caused him to miss out on lucrative overtime pay.3 He
eventually filed suit, alleging B&B violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which requires an employer to “reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice” unless doing so would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer’s business.”4
Christmon did not fare well in litigation. The district court granted
B&B summary judgment, which the Tenth Circuit affirmed.5 That B&B
won and Christmon lost is hardly surprising: employee victories in
religious accommodation cases tend to be few and far between.6

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc., 735 F. App’x 510, 512 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
Christmon, 735 F. App’x at 515.
See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 929 (2003) (explaining why it
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Nevertheless, the case is alarming because of how the court reached its
decision. The appellate court held that B&B’s accommodation—
refraining from firing Chrismon for his Saturday absences—was
reasonable because it allowed him to keep his job, no matter how it
otherwise impacted his employment.7 The court’s opinion is devoid of any
analysis of how much overtime pay Christmon was unable to earn,
whether his Saturday absences or inability to work overtime hindered his
opportunities for promotion, or whether the accommodation adversely
impacted some other term or condition of his employment. The court
instead emphasized that “a reasonable accommodation does not
necessarily spare an employee from any resulting cost” and that an
“accommodation may be reasonable even though it is not the one that the
employee prefers.”8 In essence, the court told Christmon to quit
complaining—he was lucky to have kept his job.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision is symptomatic of a
disconcerting trend whereby courts assess a religious accommodation’s
validity without duly considering how it impacts the employee’s terms or
conditions of employment. Despite Title VII’s plain language requiring
employers to provide reasonable accommodations,9 courts are effectively
reading this requirement out of the statute by (1) conflating
reasonableness and undue hardship so that an accommodation’s
reasonableness depends solely on whether it causes the employer undue
hardship, (2) setting the bar for reasonableness so low it is practically
meaningless, or (3) ignoring the requirement altogether.
This trend is made more egregious by the fact it is part of a longstanding
judicial crusade to dilute Title VII’s religious accommodation provision.
More than four decades ago, the Supreme Court gutted the statute by
construing “undue hardship” to mean anything more than a de minimis
burden to the employer10—essentially giving employers the green light to

is easier for an employer to defeat a religious accommodation claim than a disability accommodation
claim); Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims Make
the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 519–20 (arguing that
plaintiffs face “an insurmountable burden” in proving religious accommodation claims).
7. Christmon, 735 F. App’x at 514 (concluding the accommodation was reasonable because it
“allowed Mr. Christmon to avoid the conflict with his religious beliefs even if he lost the opportunity
for overtime”).
8. Id.
9. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“The intent and effect of
[Title VII’s reasonable accommodation provision] was to make it an unlawful employment
practice . . . for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for
the religious practices of his employees and prospective employees.”).
10. Id. at 84.
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deny religious accommodations in all but the narrowest circumstances.11
But the courts did not stop there. They also have denied employees the
right to select their preferred accommodation, have upheld
accommodations that only partially resolve the conflict between an
employee’s job and religion, and have been reluctant to require employers
to engage in the same interactive process with an employee seeking a
religious accommodation as they must with an employee seeking a
disability accommodation.12 This judicial hostility toward religious
accommodations has created a vast power imbalance between employers
and religious-accommodation seekers. Employers wield virtual carte
blanche over if, how, and when employees are accommodated, whereas
employees have little, if any, say in such matters.
This Article argues for the restoration of employees’ right to reasonable
religious accommodations. It does so by first asserting that reasonableness
under Title VII is a standalone requirement, separate and distinct from the
statute’s undue hardship provision. While undue hardship should be
evaluated from the employer’s perspective, reasonableness must be
assessed from the employee’s point of view. Decoupling these terms
would force courts to consider an accommodation’s impact on both the
employer and the employee. The Article then proposes three requirements
for an accommodation to be reasonable: (1) it must fully eliminate the
conflict between the employee’s job and religious beliefs, (2) it must not
cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) it
must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s terms or conditions
of employment. This conceptualization of reasonableness comports with
Congress’s intent that when possible, employees should not be forced to
choose between their jobs and their religious convictions.13
Had the Tenth Circuit applied this framework in Christmon v. B&B
Airparts, Inc.,14 its analysis—and perhaps conclusion—would have been
different. Instead of proclaiming the accommodation reasonable simply

11. See infra section I.B.1.
12. See infra section I.B.4.
13. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that Title VII was designed to protect employees from choosing “between their religious
convictions and their job”), rev’d on other grounds, 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Protos v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634
(1931)) (noting that Title VII’s accommodation requirement is “plainly intended to relieve individuals
of the burden of choosing between their jobs and their religious convictions, where such relief will
not unduly burden others”); Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s Choice Model
for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 475–76 (2006) (recounting that the lead sponsor
of Title VII’s religious accommodation bill believed it “would save employees the pain of having to
choose between their religions and their jobs”).
14. 735 F. App’x 510 (10th Cir. 2018).
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because it allowed Christmon to keep his job, the court would have
considered whether B&B’s decision to not fire Christmon for his Saturday
absences was a reasonable accommodation from Christmon’s point of
view. Because the accommodation eliminated the conflict between
Christmon’s job and religion and did not constitute an adverse
employment action, the court would have focused on the third element of
reasonableness: whether the accommodation unnecessarily disadvantaged
the terms or conditions of his employment. The accommodation
disadvantaged Christmon by preventing him from earning overtime pay.
Whether this disadvantage was “unnecessary” would depend on whether
B&B, without undue hardship, could have accommodated Christmon in a
manner less burdensome to his employment. The court would have probed
the feasibility of B&B allowing Christmon to work his overtime on
Sundays, as he requested, without suffering undue hardship to its
business—a crucial question the Tenth Circuit ignored. If B&B could
have accommodated Christmon in this manner (a very real possibility,
given that it had allowed him to work on Sunday in at least one instance15),
the company’s decision to accommodate him by not firing him would
have been unreasonable because it unnecessarily disadvantaged
his employment.
The need for reasonable religious accommodations has never been
greater. Religious discrimination charges filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have doubled over the
past two decades, from 1,709 or 2.1% of all charges in 1997 to 3,436 or
4.1% of all charges in 2017.16 The courts continue to whittle away at the
right to religious accommodation at a time when they should be expanding
it. Not only does the American workforce continue to grow more
religiously diverse than ever,17 but employees are becoming increasingly

15. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Christmon, 735 F. App’x 510 (No. 17-3209).
16. See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 19, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/8UT7-2SMX].
17. See PAUL D. NUMRICH, THE FAITH NEXT DOOR: AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND THEIR NEW
RELIGIOUS NEIGHBORS 6 (2009) (arguing that even skeptics of religious-affiliation data “admit that
the United States is more religiously diverse today than ever before and will likely continue to
diversify in the future”); ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY: FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 AMERICAN VALUES ATLAS 10 (2017), https://www.prri.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U45-H8YG] (“The American
religious landscape has undergone dramatic changes in the last decade and is more diverse today than
at any time since modern sociological measurements began.”). Because immigration is largely driving
the increase in religious diversification, both among and within religions, America’s religious
landscape should continue to diversify so long as immigration rates remain steady. See DIANA L. ECK,
A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S
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intent on expressing their religious beliefs at work.18 Consequently,
employers face tremendous pressure to accommodate a broader range of
religious beliefs and behaviors with which they may have little or no
familiarity,19 which can result in employers providing inadequate
accommodations or, worse yet, no accommodation at all. If adopted, this
Article’s conceptualization of reasonableness could help defuse what is
becoming an explosive situation by ensuring that when an employer can
accommodate an employee without undue hardship, the accommodation
provided is reasonable to the employee.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background on the
genesis of the right to workplace religious accommodations. It also details
the judicial efforts to diminish this right. Part II focuses on the growing
tendency of courts to read the reasonableness requirement out of
Title VII’s religious accommodation provision. Part III explains why
reasonableness and undue hardship are not two sides of the same coin but
are in fact separate and distinct concepts that require analysis from
different points of view. It draws upon Title VII’s text, legislative history,
EEOC guidance, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and other judicial
decisions to demonstrate why an accommodation’s reasonableness must
be assessed from the employee’s perspective. Part IV proposes a test for
reasonableness centered on how an accommodation impacts an

MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1–4 (2001) (explaining how immigration has contributed to
greater internal diversity within established religious traditions); PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICA’S
CHANGING
RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE
53
(2015),
https://www.pewforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S58E-SEV6] (noting
that the vast majority of Hindus and Muslims in the United States are either immigrants or children
of immigrants).
18. See Sonia Ghumman, Ann Marie Ryan, Lizabeth A. Barclay & Karen S. Markel, Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace: A Review and Examination of Current and Future Trends, 28 J.
BUS. & PSYCH. 439, 449 (2013) (citing studies in support of their conclusion that “[a]s American
organizations increasingly promote diverse workplaces in the belief that diversity adds value for their
organizations, the number of organizations allowing such workplace religious expression has
expanded” and “the number of employees who wish to express their religion at work has increased”);
see also Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious Accommodation in
the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 706–08 (2015) (explaining that increased religious expression
in the workplace is attributable to demographic factors such as the aging baby boomer generation,
cultural factors such as workers’ expectations of being able to express their whole selves in the
workplace, religious factors such as increased public evangelism, and reimagined workplaces in
which employees are free to express themselves).
19. See Ghumman et al., supra note 18, at 449 (“[A]lthough most American workplaces may be
secular in nature, the majority of work policies and procedures favor Christian practices and
observances (i.e., no work on Sundays, Christmas is considered a federal holiday) . . . . As religious
diversity increases, some of the religions gaining increasing representation in America (i.e., Muslims,
Sikhs) may have certain religious-based obligations requiring expression and requests for religious
accommodations such as religious holidays during regular workdays, time off for prayer/rituals,
religious attire, and grooming practices will also inevitably increase.”).
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employee’s ability to practice their religion and perform their job. It also
explores the potential impact of adopting this conceptualization
of reasonableness.
I.

THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION

This Part begins with background on how Title VII came to require
accommodation of religious beliefs. Understanding the origins of the
religious accommodation provision is key to why an accommodation’s
reasonableness must be evaluated from the employee’s point of view. It
then examines how the courts have cut away at the right to
accommodation to the point it is practically nonexistent.
A.

Origins

Enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”20 Title VII initially did not require employers to provide
religious accommodations.21 This quickly became problematic because
even though an employer could not terminate an employee because of
their religion, the statute in no way limited the employer’s ability to
terminate an employee whose religious beliefs interfered with their job
performance.22 Thus, it was illegal for an employer to terminate an
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). How religion came to be included as a protected class is something
of a mystery, as the legislative history indicates Congress’s near singular focus was on enacting
legislation to eradicate racial discrimination in employment. See Julia Bruzina, Erickson v. Bartell:
The “Common Sense” Approach to Employer-Based Insurance for Women, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 463,
474 (2003) (explaining how the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shows Congress’s
focus “was primarily, if not solely, on race”); Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age
Discrimination Claims by Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis–A Pragmatic
Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 115, 122 (1998) (“When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
in 1964, its central focus was to eradicate race discrimination against African-Americans and other
minority groups.”); James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (“[T]here is little in the way of legislative history to determine whether
Congress considered religion an immutable characteristic, whether it was singled out for protection
based on its historical importance in the constitutional context, or for some other reason.”). At any
rate, its inclusion in Title VII places religion on equal footing with race, color, sex, and national origin.
21. Marion K. McDonald, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory Religious
Accommodation in the Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 136–37 (1984) (“When it was first enacted
in 1964, title VII did not contain a religious accommodation provision.”).
22. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (“The prohibition against
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employee for belonging to the Seventh Day Adventist faith, but the
employer was well within its right to fire the employee if they were unable
to work on Saturdays because of their religious beliefs. This loophole
allowed employers to indirectly discriminate against employees because
of their religious beliefs without running afoul of the statute.
Inundated with complaints from employees whose employers refused
to allow them time off to observe their Sabbath or religious holidays,23 the
EEOC issued guidelines in 1966,24 which it refined in 1967, suggesting
employers bore an affirmative duty to “make reasonable accommodations
to the religious needs of employees . . . where such accommodations can
be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”25 This was a fairly radical proposition for its time. Up until
then, antidiscrimination statutes were entirely proscriptive in the sense
that they merely prohibited employers from taking discriminatory action.
Not surprisingly, this guidance carried little weight with the courts. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was particularly hostile to the notion of
accommodation, holding in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.26 that the
EEOC’s position was inconsistent with Title VII, as the legislative history
did not reflect any “Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person
to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another.”27
When the Supreme Court affirmed Dewey by an equally divided court
in 1971,28 West Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph, himself a Seventh
Day Baptist, responded by leading a charge to amend Title VII to require
religious accommodation.29 Congress was more open to this idea than the
courts had been, as Senator Randolph’s bill sailed through both chambers

religious discrimination soon raised the question of whether it was impermissible under [Title VII] to
discharge or refuse to hire a person who for religious reasons refused to work during the employer’s
normal workweek.”).
23. See Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It Reasonable to
the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002) (recounting that the EEOC “raised the
issue of reasonable accommodation two years after the law had gone into effect due to complaints
from religious employees that employers were refusing to allow them to take time off during the
regular work week in order to observe holy days”).
24. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (June 15, 1966) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605).
25. 32 Fed. Reg. 10298 (July 13, 1967) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605).
26. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per
curiam).
27. Id. at 334.
28. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971).
29. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection
of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 584
(2000) (“The amendment was introduced by Senator Jennings Randolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist, with
the express purpose of protecting Sabbatarians.”).
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with almost no scrutiny.30 Enacted just one year after Dewey, the
amendment closely tracked the EEOC’s guidelines by expanding the
definition of “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer’s business.”31 Although this language has
remained unchanged in the decades since, how the courts have interpreted
and applied it has evolved significantly.
B.

Erosion

The amendment of Title VII did not end judicial skepticism of religious
accommodations. Just five years later, the Supreme Court effectively
gutted the amendment by setting the bar for undue hardship as low as
possible.32 But instead of attempting to minimize the damage, subsequent
courts piled on. They not only embraced the low standard for undue
hardship but also found further ways to strip the religious accommodation
provision of its force.
1.

Undue Hardship

In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,33 the Supreme Court
considered the circumstances under which an employer could deny a
religious accommodation because of undue hardship.34 When Larry
Hardison joined the Worldwide Church of God, he asked to be excused
from Saturday shifts to observe his Sabbath.35 TWA agreed to allow him
to seek a change of work assignments to accommodate his religious needs,
but the union that represented him refused because it would have violated
the collective bargaining agreement.36 TWA rejected a proposal that
Hardison only work four days per week.37 Leaving the position empty or
filling it with an employee from another area would have impaired
operations, and employing someone not regularly assigned to Saturday
30. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing that Title VII’s
religious accommodation measure “was passed by a unanimous vote in the Senate” and “similar
approval by the House of Representatives”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
32. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
33. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
34. Id. at 84.
35. Id. at 67–68.
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id.
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shifts would have required the company to pay overtime wages.38 TWA
ultimately concluded it could not accommodate Hardison without undue
hardship, a determination Hardison challenged in subsequent litigation.39
The district court sided with TWA, but the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed.40 In overturning the appellate court, the Supreme Court
famously declared that requiring an employer “to bear more than a de
minimis cost” to accommodate an employee’s religious needs constitutes
undue hardship.41 In doing so, the Court applied one of the lowest legal
standards42 to a statutory phrase that ordinarily denotes more stringency.43
Because accommodating Hardison would have imposed more than a de
minimis cost to TWA, the company had no duty to accommodate him
at all.44
The Hardison decision drew immediate criticism, most notably from
Justice Marshall, who, in his blistering dissent, lamented that the majority
opinion “deal[t] a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate
work requirements to religious practices.”45 He found the decision
“deeply troubling” as a matter of social policy because it forced
employees into “the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their
job” and “intolerable” as a matter of law because it “adopt[ed] the very
position that Congress expressly rejected in 1972, as if we were free to
disregard congressional choices that a majority of this Court
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 84.
Translated from Latin, “de minimis” means “of the least.” De minimis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 524 (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “de minimis” as “trifling,”
“negligible,” and “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.” Id. Courts
have characterized the standard in a similar manner. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting the de minimis standard as so low that employers “need not grant even the
most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their faith”); Faul v.
Potter, 355 F. App’x 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the standard as “minimal”); Beyer v. Cnty.
of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the standard is “neither onerous, nor intended
to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic” (citation omitted)); Dupree v. UHAB-Sterling St. Hous. Dev.
Fund Corp., No. 10-CV-1894, 2012 WL 3288234, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (stating the
standard is “not a heavy burden”); Franklin v. Astrue, No. 11-615-MJP-MAT, 2012 WL 3059407, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2012) (referring to the standard as “extremely low”).
43. See Undue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “undue” as “excessive or
unwarranted”); Hardship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “hardship” as
“privation; suffering or adversity”). The Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship” in Title VII stands
in stark contrast to how Congress defined the term in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Similar to Title VII, it requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities
absent undue hardship, which the statute defines as “an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
44. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84–85.
45. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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thinks unwise.”46
Rather than question Hardison’s soundness, the lower courts have
embraced it, routinely granting employers summary judgment if an
accommodation would impose on the employer virtually any burden at
all.47 In fact, some courts have gone so far as to grant employers summary
judgment, not because of any actual hardship, but because of the mere
possibility of hardship in the future.48
The courts’ willingness to strike down many religious accommodation
claims on undue hardship grounds has prompted litigants to petition the
Supreme Court to overrule Hardison.49 To date, the Court has declined to
revisit the issue. Likewise, Congress has repeatedly considered amending
Title VII to raise the undue hardship standard via the Workplace Religious
Freedom Act (WRFA).50 The most recent version of the legislation noted
that Hardison had “narrowed the scope of protection of [T]itle VII against
religious discrimination in employment, contrary to the intent of
Congress,” and consequently, “discrimination against employees on the
basis of religion in employment continues to be an unfortunate and
unacceptable reality.”51 Despite bipartisan support,52 WRFA has never
come particularly close to passing.53

46. Id. at 87.
47. See, e.g., Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
“mere possibility of an adverse impact” was enough to constitute undue hardship after Hardison).
48. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581, 588–89 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the employee’s request for a scheduling accommodation “would produce undue hardship for
Walgreens in the future” based on the possibility that the employer would have been required to
reschedule certain training sessions); Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 519–20 (6th
Cir. 2002) (approving and applying Weber’s “mere possibility” standard).
49. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28–34, Patterson, 727 F. App’x 581 (No. 18-349)
(petitioning the Supreme Court to revisit Hardison on the ground the decision was poorly reasoned
and runs contrary to congressional intent; petition denied).
50. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008);
H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 893,
108th Cong. (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1668, 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 4117, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (1994).
51. S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 2(3)–(4) (2012).
52. See, for example, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007), which was introduced by an equal number
of Republican and Democratic Representatives. See generally LORRAINE C. MILLER, CLERK OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICIAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE (2009) (showing the party affiliation of
every member of the House of Representatives of the 110th Congress).
53. The legislation died in committee the last time it was proposed. See S. 3686 (112th): Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3686#ov
erview [https://perma.cc/V964-DN69].
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Preferred Accommodation

Nine years after Hardison, the Supreme Court dealt a second blow to
religious accommodations by holding in Ansonia Board of Education v.
Philbrook54 that employees are not entitled to their preferred
accommodation in a scenario where multiple accommodation options
exist.55 Ronald Philbrook was a high school teacher, who, like Hardison,
belonged to the Worldwide Church of God.56 His faith required him to
refrain from performing secular work during designated holy days, which
caused him to miss approximately six school days annually.57 Under the
applicable bargaining agreement, Philbrook could take up to three days of
paid leave each year to observe mandatory religious holidays.58 The
contract also allowed teachers to use three additional days of accumulated
leave each year for “necessary personal business” but limited such leave
to uses not otherwise specified in the contract, including observance of
religious holidays.59 For years, Philbrook observed his religious holidays
by using his three days of paid leave granted in the contract and then
taking unpaid leave for the remaining religious holidays.60 He eventually
stopped this practice and instead opted to schedule medical appointments
on the holy days, which allowed him to use his accumulated sick leave
and therefore be paid for those absences.61 Philbrook grew dissatisfied
with this arrangement and asked the school board to either allow him to
use his personal business leave for religious observance, which was his
preferred arrangement, or pay him his full wages less the cost of a
substitute teacher for the additional days off.62 The board rejected both
proposals, prompting Philbrook to file suit alleging the board failed to
reasonably accommodate his religious needs.63
The district court ruled for the school board, concluding Philbrook had
not suffered religious discrimination because the board had not placed him
in a position of violating his religion or losing his job.64 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that if an employer and an

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

479 U.S. 60 (1986).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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employee each propose an accommodation, the employer must accept the
employee’s preferred accommodation unless such accommodation would
impose undue hardship.65 The Supreme Court rejected the appellate
court’s rule, holding that once an employer offers any reasonable
accommodation, it has fulfilled its duty and has no further obligation to
consider other accommodations proposed by the employee, even if they,
too, are reasonable and would not impose undue hardship.66
As with Hardison, lower courts have embraced Ansonia.67 This
undoubtedly simplifies the judicial task in cases where multiple
accommodations are possible. A court need only ask whether the
employer provided a reasonable accommodation without having to further
consider the availability of alternatives, whether such alternatives would
have imposed undue hardship on the employer, or whether the employer
was aware of such possibilities. But while ignoring the possibility of
alternative accommodations is certainly easier for courts, this further
shifts power from the employee to the employer to determine the
appropriate accommodation. Consequently, employees have even less say
over if or how they are accommodated.
3.

Partial Accommodation

While some courts are adamant that an accommodation must eliminate
the conflict between work and religion,68 a growing number are taking the
opposite view. For example, in EEOC v. Thompson Contracting, Grading,
Paving, & Utilities, Inc.,69 a dump truck driver requested Saturdays off for

65. Id. at 65–66.
66. Id. at 68. (“By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the
employer is sufficient to meets its accommodation obligation . . . . Thus, where the employer has
already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end.
The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would
result in undue hardship.”).
67. See, e.g., Newton v. Potter, No. 9:05-3165-PMD, 2007 WL 1035002, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 29,
2007) (holding that because “an employee is not entitled to the accommodation of his or her
preference,” the plaintiff had no ground for arguing the accommodation provided to her was
unreasonable, even though it nearly tripled the length of her daily commute (quoting Ansonia, 479
U.S. at 70)).
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 547–48 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the
employer’s offer to accommodate the employee who was unable to work Sundays for religious
reasons by giving him a Sunday shift that allowed him to attend his religious service “was no
accommodation at all because . . . it would not permit him to observe his religious requirement to
abstain from work totally on Sundays”); EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (holding that the employer’s offer to give a Jewish worker who requested Yom
Kippur off a different day off “cannot be considered reasonable . . . because it does not eliminate the
conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice”).
69. 793 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 275 (4th Cir. 2012).
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religious reasons.70 The district court concluded the company satisfied its
duty under Title VII by invoking its paid personal leave policy—even
though the policy did not apply to the driver.71 The court reasoned that
“[a]lthough as a 90-day probationary employee, [the driver] was not yet
able to take advantage of this policy, this fact ‘does not negate the
reasonableness of the accommodation.’”72 Thus, the court upheld as
reasonable an accommodation that was unavailable to the employee and
therefore did not eliminate the conflict between his job and
religious beliefs.
In George v. Home Depot, Inc.,73 a store greeter asked to not work
Sundays, consistent with her Catholic faith. Home Depot responded by
offering to schedule her Sunday shifts around her church services.74 The
district court concluded this constituted a reasonable accommodation even
though it did not resolve the conflict between the employee’s job and
religious beliefs.75
Similarly, in Henry v. Rexam Beverage Can of North America,76 a
mechanic requested Saturdays off to observe his Sabbath. His employer
initially allowed him to swap shifts with coworkers and to pay them $100
out of his own pocket to give them the equivalent of “premium overtime
pay.”77 But when his employer later informed him that he had to cease this
practice because the payments violated company policy, nobody would
swap shifts with him.78 Nevertheless, the district court held that the
company reasonably accommodated the employee by allowing him to ask
coworkers to trade shifts with him, even though none of them would do
so.79 In each of these cases, the courts held that the employer fulfilled its
accommodation duty even though the employee was still faced with
having to choose between his job and his religious beliefs.
4.

Interactive Process

Courts further manifest their disdain for religious accommodations
through their reluctance to require employers to engage in the same
70. Id. at 742–43.
71. Id. at 745.
72. Id.
73. No. 00-2616, 2001 WL 1558315, at *5, *8 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2001), aff’d, 51 F. App’x 482 (5th
Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id. at *7–9.
76. No. 3:10-2800-MBS-SVH, 2012 WL 2501994, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2012).
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *8.
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interactive process with religious-accommodation seekers as they do with
disability-accommodation seekers.80 The interactive process generally
requires an employer and an employee to work together in good faith to
determine whether the employee can be reasonably accommodated, for
the employer to give due consideration to the employee’s preferred
accommodation, and for the employer to ultimately select the
accommodation most suitable for both parties.81 Neither Title VII nor the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) references an interactive
process, but the EEOC has nonetheless interpreted both statutes as
requiring it.82 The courts uniformly follow the EEOC’s guidance in
requiring the interactive process for disability accommodations, yet they
have been much slower to mandate it for religious accommodations.83
This is puzzling, given the courts’ own recognition that the ADA and
Title VII should be interpreted consistently whenever possible.84
80. See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodations, 71 ALA. L. REV. 67, 86–89 (2019)
(detailing how courts are hesitant to apply the interactive process requirement to religious
accommodations claims and offering possible reasons why this might be the case).
81. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2019).
82. See id. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be
necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation.”); Flake, supra note 80, at 83–86 (detailing the EEOC’s
position that the interactive process applies to religious accommodations, as set forth in the
Commission’s Compliance Manual, press releases, legal briefs, administrative decisions, and consent
decrees).
83. Compare Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“Identifying reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee requires both employer and
employee to engage in a flexible interactive process.”), and Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239
F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once an employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation,
that employer has a mandatory obligation under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with the
employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.”), with Miller v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 351 F. Supp. 3d 762, 787 (D.N.J. 2018) (acknowledging courts “have not been
consistent” in deciding whether the interactive process applies to religious accommodations), and
Bolden v. Caravan Facilities Mgmt., LLC, 112 F. Supp. 3d 785, 791 (N.D. Ind. 2015) (noting the
absence of authority suggesting the interactive process applies to religious accommodations), and
Dodd v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 06-4213, 2008 WL 2902618, at *9 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2008)
(questioning whether the interactive process applies to religious accommodations where the plaintiff
failed to “offer any legal authority for the proposition”).
84. See, e.g., Garity v. APWU Nat’l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 858 n.9 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining
that “due to the similarities in language and purpose between the two statutes, courts around the
country—unless they find a good reason to do otherwise—generally use Title VII precedent to
interpret ADA claims”); EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.11 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Due
to the similarities between the ADA and Title VII, we generally interpret those statutes
consistently.”); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We
conclude that the language of Title VII and the ADA dictates a consistent reading of the two
statutes.”); Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., No. C94-3008, 1996 WL 33423409, at *2 (N.D. Iowa
Sept. 17, 1996) (relying on ADA case law, which the court characterized as “useful instruction,” to
determine whether the failure to accommodate constitutes a form of intentional discrimination under

Flake (Do Not Delete)

1688

12/14/2020 10:14 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1673

Requiring the interactive process for disability accommodations but not
for religious accommodations means employees seeking a disability
accommodation can rightfully expect employers to seek their input
regarding potential accommodations and to duly consider their preferred
accommodation, whereas employees seeking a religious accommodation
cannot expect to have this same level of involvement. Reluctance to
extend the interactive process requirement to religious accommodations
constitutes a subtle, yet powerful, way in which courts continue to shift
the power dynamic ever further in employers’ favor.
II.

READING OUT REASONABLENESS

In recent years, courts have employed a new tactic to further diminish
Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement. Despite the statute’s
clear mandate that employers must provide reasonable religious
accommodations, courts are effectively reading this requirement out of
the statute. Eliminating the reasonableness requirement further strips the
statute of its force, as employers can offer whatever accommodation they
want, regardless of how it might adversely affect the employee’s terms or
conditions of employment, so long as the employee is allowed to keep
their job. This Part examines the various ways courts do this, including by
conflating reasonableness and undue hardship, by setting the bar for
reasonableness too low, and by ignoring the requirement altogether.
A.

Conflating Reasonableness and Undue Hardship

One way courts are reading the reasonableness requirement out of
Title VII is by conflating reasonableness with the statute’s undue hardship
provision. These courts consider reasonableness and undue hardship as
two sides of the same coin: an accommodation is reasonable only if it does
not cause the employer undue hardship. Equating reasonableness to undue
hardship renders the reasonableness requirement superfluous and
nonsensical, as the validity of an accommodation then turns on whether it
would cause undue hardship to the employer. And yet, that is precisely
Title VII). The need for consistency between the ADA and Title VII is likewise expressed in the
legislative history to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, wherein the Judiciary Committee made clear
its “inten[t] that these other laws modeled after Title VII [including the ADA] be interpreted
consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act.” JUDICIARY COMM., H.R.
REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. Theoretically, the
discrepancy could be attributable to the fact that courts owe the EEOC’s ADA guidelines Chevron
deference but only need apply Skidmore deference to the Commission’s religious accommodation
guidance. See Flake, supra note 80, at 85. But even under Skidmore, there is no reason for a court to
reject the EEOC’s position, as there is nothing about its view that the interactive process applies to
religious accommodations that seems “hasty, invalid, or inconsistent.” Id. at 88.
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what several courts have held.
In EEOC v. Universal Manufacturing Co.,85 the Fifth Circuit expressed
a view of reasonableness focused entirely on how the accommodation
would impact the employer: “Reasonableness seems to focus more upon
the cost to the employer, the extent of positive involvement which the
employer must exercise, and the existence of overt discrimination by the
employer.”86 How the accommodation would impact the employee is
wholly omitted from this court’s conceptualization of reasonableness.
Consistent with this position, the Fourth Circuit noted in EEOC v.
Firestone Fibers & Textile Co.87 that while reasonableness and undue
hardship are “separate and distinct” inquiries, they are “interrelated” and
“there is much overlap between the two.”88 It explained that “‘reasonably
accommodate’ in the religious context incorporates more than just
whether the conflict between the employee’s beliefs and employer’s work
requirements have been eliminated. Considering an accommodation’s
impact on both the employer and coworkers, for example, is appropriate
when determining its reasonableness.”89 Here, the court expanded its
consideration of reasonableness to include how an accommodation would
affect coworkers, yet it continued to ignore how the accommodation
would impact the accommodation seeker himself. In affirming summary
judgment for Firestone, the court rejected the argument that the employer
should have accommodated the plaintiff, who needed extra time off for
religious observance, by making an exception to its sixty-hour cap on
unpaid leave.90 The court held that the accommodation was
unreasonable—not that it would impose undue hardship—because of “the
sheer number of hours a small group of coworkers would have been forced
to cover,” which in turn risked “lowering morale by displaying favoritism,
impinging on the shift rights of other employees, and violating the CBA
and its seniority-based scheduling system.”91 The EEOC sharply criticized
the court’s approach, explaining in its Compliance Manual that Firestone
“conflicts with longstanding Commission and judicial precedent” because
it “analyz[es] reasonableness of proposed accommodation based on facts
typically considered as part of undue hardship analysis.”92
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

914 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 73 n.3.
515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318–19.
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL NO. 915.003,
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The tendency of courts to assess reasonableness from the employer’s
point of view is evident in a variety of other judicial opinions. In Adeyeye
v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC,93 a case involving an employee’s request
for unpaid leave to return to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rights, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “[r]easonableness is
assessed in context, of course, and this evaluation will turn in part on
whether or not the employer can in fact continue to function absent undue
hardship if the employee is permitted to take unpaid leave on the needed
schedule.”94 In Williams v. Harvey,95 the district court characterized
Hardison as standing for the proposition that “[a]ccommodations are
deemed unreasonable if they cause an employer undue hardship, that is,
they result in ‘more than a de minimis cost to the employer.’”96 And in
Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, G.P.,97 the district court considered the
appropriateness of a scheduling accommodation that would have required
a coworker to work nearly twenty-two hours in a thirty-two hour span.98
It concluded “this scenario would have indeed created an undue hardship
that would have rendered [the] request . . . unreasonable.”99 Thus, the
court determined the reasonableness of the accommodation by whether it
would cause the employer vis-à-vis a coworker undue hardship. Finally,
it is telling that some courts have actually combined reasonableness and
undue hardship into a single term: “unreasonable hardship.”100
B.

Lowering the Reasonableness Bar
Even courts that acknowledge undue hardship and reasonableness as

SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION § 12-IV(A)(3) n.130 (2008) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE
MANUAL], https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#_ftn130 [https://perma.cc/BGK4VFMB].
93. 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013).
94. Id. at 447, 455.
95. No. 4:05-CV-161, 2006 WL 2456406 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2006).
96. Id. at *11.
97. 719 F. Supp. 2d 918, 932 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
98. Id. at 931–32.
99. Id. at 932.
100. See, e.g., Franks v. Nebraska, No. 4:10-CV-3145, 2012 WL 71707, at *12 (D. Neb. Jan. 10,
2012) (“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show either
that it offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or that doing so would cause the employer to
suffer an unreasonable hardship.”); Adams v. Retail Ventures, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-120-SEB-WGH,
2008 WL 11452088, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2008) (holding that the proposed accommodation “would
have resulted in an unreasonable hardship” to the employer); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
No. 3:04-CV-000206-WRW, 2006 WL 318828, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 9, 2006) (“An employer is
required to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of their employees unless such
an accommodation would cause the employer unreasonable hardship.”).
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distinct concepts can nonetheless eviscerate the reasonableness
requirement by setting the bar for what is reasonable so low it is virtually
meaningless. Title VII does not define reasonableness, nor has the
Supreme Court provided a definition. However, the Court provided
important guidance on this issue in Ansonia. While the case is best known
for its holding that employees are not entitled to their preferred
accommodation, it is also noteworthy for its analysis of whether the
accommodation the school board offered (unpaid leave for religiousbased absences) was reasonable. The district court entered judgment for
the board, concluding the accommodation was reasonable because it did
not place Philbrook “in a position of violating his religion or losing his
job” since he was able to miss work to observe his religious holidays and
remain employed.101 The appellate court likewise assumed the leave
policy constituted a reasonable accommodation, but it went on to hold that
where an employer and an employee both propose a reasonable
accommodation, the employer must accept the employee’s proposal
absent undue hardship.102 While the appellate court’s approach
commanded most of the Supreme Court’s attention, the Court addressed
the reasonableness of the accommodation, explaining that “[b]ecause both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an
erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question.”103
Dissatisfied with the district court’s determination that an accommodation
is per se reasonable so long as it permits an employee to practice his
religion and keep his job, the Court engaged in a more nuanced analysis.
It agreed “[t]he provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between
employment requirements and religious practices”—but its inquiry did
not end there.104 The Court went on to explain that not only did the
accommodation eliminate the conflict, but it also merely caused him to
lose income for the days he did not work.105 “[S]uch an exclusion,” the
Court noted, “has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities
or job status.”106 Crucially, the Court did not assess the accommodation’s
reasonableness solely by whether it eliminated the conflict between

101. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., No. N 77-489, 1984 WL 49016, at *9 (D. Conn. May 18,
1984).
102. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985).
103. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 71. The Court ultimately remanded the case because of a factual dispute as to whether
the school board’s personal leave provision was applied in a discriminatory manner, i.e., that teachers
could use it for secular reasons but not religious ones. Id. The Court held that if this were the case,
the accommodation would not be reasonable. Id.
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Philbrook’s job and religion but also by how it might have otherwise
impacted the terms and conditions of his employment.
Despite the Supreme Court’s directive that reasonableness depends on
whether the accommodation eliminates the conflict and how the
accommodation otherwise affects the employee’s employment, courts
routinely cite Ansonia for the proposition that an accommodation is
reasonable simply if it eliminates the conflict between the employee’s job
and religious beliefs.107 This interpretation misconstrues Ansonia by
omitting further inquiry into how an accommodation affects an
employee’s employment opportunities or job status. In essence, these
courts approach reasonableness the same way the district court did in
Ansonia—which the Supreme Court explicitly disapproved as
“erroneous.”108 Whether an accommodation eliminates the conflict
between an employee’s job and religion should be the starting point, not
the deciding factor, for whether the accommodation is reasonable.
The practical consequence of this misreading of Ansonia is that courts
often assess reasonableness solely by whether an accommodation
eliminates the conflict between an employee’s job and religion. In some
cases, an accommodation is deemed reasonable even if it does not fully
eliminate the conflict.109 This undoubtedly simplifies the judicial task, as
courts need only determine whether the accommodation allowed the
employee to remain employed without having to consider how it might
otherwise impact the employee. But this simplification comes at a cost:
An accommodation that harms an employee in other ways is deemed
reasonable as a matter of law simply because it allows the employee to
keep their job and practice their religion. For example, in Newton v.
Potter,110 a letter carrier requested to not work Saturdays in accordance
with her religious beliefs.111 The U.S. Postal Service transferred the
employee to a post office that did not require Saturday work but
lengthened her daily commute from twenty-two to sixty-six miles each
way—an extra 440 miles per week.112 The court granted the Postal Service
107. See, e.g., Walker v. Indian River Transp. Co., 741 F. App’x 740, 746 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting
that “the Supreme Court has explained that a reasonable accommodation is one that ‘eliminates the
conflict between employment requirements and religious practices’”); Sturgill v. UPS, Inc., 512 F.3d
1024, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “an accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law if it
eliminates a religious conflict”); Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581, 584 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“A reasonable accommodation is one that eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
108. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 68–79.
110. No. 9:05-3165-PMD, 2007 WL 1035002 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2007).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *4 n.2.
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summary judgment without even considering how this longer commute
impacted the employee’s employment.113 It deemed the accommodation
reasonable as a matter of law because it allowed the employee to avoid
Saturday work and keep her job.114
Similarly, in Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc.,115 a
hospital terminated a counselor who refused to counsel clients in ways
that conflicted with her religious beliefs.116 In affirming summary
judgment for the employer, the Fifth Circuit explained that the availability
of lower-paying non-counselor positions would have constituted a
reasonable accommodation because the employee could have remained
employed while avoiding having to provide counseling that conflicted
with her religious beliefs.117 It was unimportant to the court that these noncounselor positions would have required the employee to take a
“significant” pay cut.118 The court explained that such a reduction in salary
alone does not make an accommodation unreasonable.119
In Smith v. Concentra, Inc.,120 a front office specialist sued her
employer for failing to reasonably accommodate her Islamic beliefs,
which required her to attend daily religious programs from 4 p.m. to 6
p.m.121 The employee was initially scheduled to work from 7 a.m. to 4
p.m., but her hours were later changed to 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.122 Concentra
offered to accommodate the employee by allowing her to end her shift two
hours early, but this arrangement shortened her workday by two hours and
consequently diminished her earnings.123 The employee requested to
return to her 7 a.m. shift or, alternatively, to be transferred to a different
position for which she was qualified that would have allowed her to work
a full shift before 4 p.m.124 The court did not consider the feasibility of the
proposed alternatives, holding instead that Concentra reasonably
accommodated the employee as a matter of law by allowing her to leave
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id.
115. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 497–99.
117. Id. at 501–02.
118. Id. at 502 n.23.
119. Id.; see also Vaughn v. Waffle House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(holding that the employer’s offer to transfer the plaintiff to a different position that would exempt
him from Sabbath work was reasonable because it eliminated the conflict between the employee’s job
and religion, even though the new position paid $10,000 less per year than his previous position).
120. 240 F. Supp. 3d 778 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
121. Id. at 781.
122. Id. at 781–82.
123. Id. at 785.
124. Id. at 785–86.
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work two hours early, regardless of the effect on her pay.125 The court
explained that it was “aware of no authority requiring that reasonable
accommodations permit an employee to work as many hours as they
otherwise would be entitled to.”126
In each of the foregoing cases, the courts held the accommodations
were reasonable as a matter of law simply because they allowed the
employees to keep their jobs and observe their religious beliefs. But while
remaining employed is a necessary component of reasonableness, the
Supreme Court made clear in Ansonia that it is not sufficient.127 If the only
criterion for reasonableness is that the accommodation allows the
employee to keep her job, an employer could offer any accommodation it
likes that fulfills this requirement, even if the accommodation so
adversely affects the employee in other ways that it is
effectively meaningless.
C.

Ignoring Reasonableness

A final way courts nullify the reasonableness requirement is by
ignoring it altogether. The Supreme Court may have intentionally or
unintentionally endorsed this tactic in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc.,128 its most recent foray into religious accommodation
jurisprudence. The issue before the Court was whether Abercrombie could
be liable for refusing to hire an applicant who it suspected, but did not
know, would require a religious-based exemption from its dress code.129
The bulk of the Court’s opinion focuses on whether Abercrombie’s
actions were discriminatory, given the company’s lack of actual
knowledge that the applicant would need an accommodation, and thus is
not particularly illuminating as to the question of reasonableness.130 But
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, dropped a footnote that could
potentially impact how courts analyze this issue.131 In response to Justice
Alito’s concurrence arguing the plaintiff does not bear the burden to prove
failure to accommodate,132 Justice Scalia explained that if an employer “is
willing to ‘accommodate’—which means nothing more than allowing the
plaintiff to engage in her religious practice despite the employer’s normal
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 785.
Id.
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1986).
575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
Id. at 2031.
Id. at 2032–34.
Id. at 2032 n.2.
Id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring).
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rules to the contrary—adverse action ‘because of’ the religious practice is
not shown.”133 The statement is striking because it omits the
reasonableness qualifier altogether and could be read as endorsing the
district court’s approach in Ansonia,134 which the Supreme Court rejected
as “erroneous.”135 It is possible Justice Scalia was merely defining the
term in isolation, and that his omission of reasonableness was because the
Court had not been called on to assess the reasonableness of the
accommodation. But if accommodation really means “nothing more” than
allowing an employee to practice her religion and keep her job, as a literal
reading of the footnote suggests, this would obviate the need for courts to
assess reasonableness beyond whether the accommodation enabled the
employee to remain employed.136
It is not uncommon for courts to determine an accommodation’s
validity solely in terms of undue hardship.137 On some level, this makes
sense. Because the bar for undue hardship is so low, many
accommodation claims fail at this stage, since by definition
accommodation requires an employer to do something out of the
ordinary.138 There is no point in analyzing whether an accommodation is
reasonable to the employee if the accommodation cannot clear the undue
hardship bar in the first place. I am not suggesting courts should assess
reasonableness in addition to or before addressing undue hardship. But
rather than treat undue hardship as the only question, as is often the
case,139 courts should view it as the threshold question. Thus, in those
133. Id. at 2032 n.2 (majority opinion).
134. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65 (1986).
135. Id. at 70.
136. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct at 2028 n.2. Given the recency of this decision, it is unclear what
impact, if any, it will have on how courts evaluate reasonableness. To date, two circuit courts and one
district court have cited Abercrombie for its definition of accommodation. See Tabura v. Kellogg
USA, 880 F.3d 544, 550 (10th Cir. 2018); Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc., 735 F. App’x 510, 514
(10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1064 (9th Cir. 2016); Hittle v. City of
Stockton, No. 2:12-cv-00766-TLN-KJN, 2018 WL 1367451, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018).
137. See, e.g., Bethea v. Access Bank, No. 8:17CV135, 2018 WL3009114, at *8–9 (D. Neb. June
15, 2018) (granting summary judgment to the employer because accommodating the plaintiff’s
request to not work Saturdays would have caused undue hardship, either by requiring the bank to hire
additional workers or by forcing other employees to work additional shifts); Hill v. Promise Hosp. of
Phoenix, Inc., No. 09-cv-1958-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2812913, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2010) (granting
employer’s motion to dismiss, in part because accommodating the plaintiff’s request to not disclose
his social security number would have caused the employer undue hardship).
138. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 231 (2000) (explaining
that “[a]n ‘accommodation mandate’ is a requirement that employers take special steps in response to
the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable demographic groups of workers”).
139. See, e.g., Baltgalvis v. Newport News Shipbuilding Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 414, 419–20 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (granting summary judgment to the employer upon determination that the requested
accommodation would impose undue hardship).
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instances where an accommodation would not impose more than de
minimis cost, the inquiry would not end there. Instead, a court would go
on to consider whether the accommodation is reasonable from the
employee’s point of view.
III. REASONABLENESS FROM THE EMPLOYEE’S
PERSPECTIVE
To restore employees’ right to reasonable religious accommodations,
the first task is to disentangle reasonableness from undue hardship. Unless
the two are treated as separate and distinct concepts, there is no
justification for considering how an accommodation impacts the
employee; the focus would rest entirely on whether it would cause the
employer undue hardship. This Part shows how the statutory text,
legislative history, EEOC guidance, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and
other judicial decisions support the proposition that reasonableness is a
standalone concept that courts must evaluate from the employee’s point
of view.
A.

Title VII’s Statutory Text

It is impossible to discern from Title VII’s text alone what Congress
meant by “reasonably accommodate.”140 The phrasing of the
accommodation provision is undoubtedly awkward, perhaps in part
because of its placement in the statute’s definition of religion rather than
the more logical “unlawful employment practices” section.141 From a
linguistic standpoint, the ambiguity stems from the location of the term in
a phrase that references both the employer’s duties and the employee’s
religious needs.142 It can be read as requiring an employer to provide an
accommodation that is reasonable to the employer, meaning one that does
not cause the employer undue hardship. Or it can be read as requiring an
employer, in the absence of undue hardship, to provide an accommodation
that is reasonable to the employee.
Title VII is not the first statute to contain ambiguous language, and
courts have developed a number of strategies to discern congressional
intent when a statute’s language is unclear. One method is to look to the
canons of statutory construction for assistance in ascertaining a statute’s
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
141. Id. § 2000e-2.
142. Id. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer’s business.”).
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meaning.143 At least one canon, that “a court should give effect, if
possible, to every clause or word of a statute,”144 is potentially instructive
here. This canon “encourages courts to give meaning to every word used
in a statute to realize congressional intent” based on the assumption “that
Congress would not have included superfluous language.”145 This canon
cuts against the notion that reasonableness and undue hardship are a single
concept. If they were two sides of the same coin, the reasonableness
qualifier would be redundant and unnecessary since the employer’s
accommodation duty is already limited by the undue hardship restriction.
In essence, reasonableness could be removed from the statute without
changing the employer’s accommodation duty in the slightest—it would
still hinge on whether the accommodation imposed undue hardship. But
because “it is a presumption of statutory construction that Congress
intended every word to have independent meaning,”146 reasonableness
and undue hardship cannot mean the same thing. If reasonableness has
any independent meaning, it must be that Congress intended for it to be
determined from the employee’s point of view.147
Another technique courts often apply in resolving statutory ambiguities
is to “consider the interpretation of other statutory provisions that employ
the same or similar language.”148 The ADA is the most logical starting
point, as courts have held that it and Title VII should be interpreted
143. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Mia. Seaquarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1147
(11th Cir. 2018) (“[O]ur authority to interpret statutory language is constrained by the plain meaning
of the statutory language in the context of the entire statute, as assisted by
the canons of statutory construction.”).
144. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 104 (1990).
145. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Bohner v. Burwell, No. 15-4088, 2016 WL 8716339, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2016) (“The [r]ule
against [s]urplusage, instructs the court to interpret a statute such that each word has meaning; nothing
is redundant, inoperative, void, or superfluous.” (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314
(2009))).
146. First Shore Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 352 B.R. 391, 393 (Bankr. D.
Md. 2006).
147. See Andrew J. Hull, Note, Complete or Partial Accommodation: An Analysis of the Federal
Circuit Split Over the Duty of the Employer to Reasonably Accommodate the Religious Beliefs of the
Employee, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 241, 259 (2012) (“While this interpretation [that reasonableness
should be assessed from the employer’s perspective] is certainly a possible inference from the
wording of the statute, it is not the most logical. Giving the employer protection in the employee’s
only provision of protection (reasonable accommodation) is redundant when the employer already
has its own provision of protection (undue hardship). If reasonableness is also the standard for
protecting the employer, then it was unnecessary for Congress to include the ‘undue hardship’
provision. But the existence of the ‘undue hardship’ provision makes it far more likely that the
protection of ‘reasonableness’ belongs solely to the employee. This is the position taken by the
Supreme Court in [Ansonia]. The Supreme Court used the term ‘reasonable’ to determine whether the
accommodation proposed by the employer subjected the employee to other discrimination.”).
148. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001).
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consistently whenever possible.149 Like Title VII, the ADA requires
employers to provide reasonable accommodations in the absence of undue
hardship,150 and courts have interpreted the two provisions as “nearly
identical.”151 Although the ADA’s phrasing is slightly different—
requiring “reasonable accommodation . . . unless . . . the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business”152—
reasonableness is no clearer here than in Title VII, leading to judicial
confusion over whether reasonableness under the ADA is determined
from the employer’s or the employee’s perspective.153
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of reasonableness under the
ADA’s accommodation provision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.154 When
Robert Barnett, a cargo handler, injured his back, US Airways
accommodated his disability by moving him to a less physically
demanding position in the mailroom.155 His new position later became
open to seniority-based bidding, and employees senior to him planned on
bidding for the position.156 US Airways declined Barnett’s request to
remain in the mailroom as an accommodation and subsequently
terminated his employment.157 In considering the relationship between
reasonableness and undue hardship, the Court rejected the notion that the
former is a “redundant mirror image” of the latter.158 The Court likewise
disagreed with Barnett’s claim that reasonableness only means the
effectiveness of an accommodation in meeting an individual’s disabilitybased needs.159 The Court explained, “[i]t is the word ‘accommodation,’
not the word ‘reasonable,’ that conveys the need for effectiveness. An
149. See cases cited supra note 84.
150. The ADA defines discrimination to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
151. Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“ADA reasonable
accommodation claims are nearly identical to the corresponding Title VII section.”); see also
Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that “Title VII . . . imposes an identical obligation on employers with respect to
accommodating religion” as the ADA does with accommodating disabilities).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
153. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship Defense, 84 MO. L.
REV. 121, 158–64 (2019) (examining ADA cases where courts exhibit confusion over the relationship
between reasonableness and undue hardship).
154. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
155. Id. at 394.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 400.
159. Id.
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ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a
disabled individual’s limitations.”160 The Court went on to adopt a twopart test to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to an accommodation
under the ADA: the plaintiff must first demonstrate that an
accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run
of cases;” to counter this showing, the employer must then prove that
despite its facial reasonableness, the accommodation would have caused
it “undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”161
In terms of its potential application to religious accommodations,
Barnett is a mixed bag. The questions of whether an accommodation must
be reasonable to an employee, and if so, what that entails, was not squarely
before the court. Nevertheless, Barnett does support the view that
reasonableness and undue hardship are not one and the same.162 And yet,
the test the Court endorsed considers reasonableness from the employer’s
perspective, not the employee’s.163 But this does not mean an
accommodation’s impact on the employee plays no part in the inquiry.
Regardless of what reasonableness means, an accommodation must
nonetheless be “effective,” which, at least in the context of the ADA,
means it must “enable . . . [the] employee to enjoy equal benefits and
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by . . . other similarly situated
employees without disabilities.”164
Although the Supreme Court has never been called upon to decide
whether Barnett is applicable to religious accommodations, it seems
unlikely this would happen. Lower courts rarely reference Barnett in
deciding religious accommodation cases, perhaps because, for all their
similarities, religious and disability accommodations fundamentally differ
in terms of what they seek to accomplish. A disability accommodation is
intended to make a disabled worker the same as others in terms of ability
to perform the job, whereas a religious accommodation is meant to make
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 401–02 (emphasis in original).
162. Even following Barnett, scholars continue to debate the meaning of reasonableness and undue
hardship in the ADA context. Mark Weber argues that “reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship are a single concept. The words form parts of a statutory sentence that links them together
into the same statutory term. The duty to make reasonable accommodations exists up to the limit of
undue hardship. At the point of undue hardship, the accommodation is no longer reasonable.” Mark
C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010). By
contrast, Nicole Buonocore Porter counters that “there is some limitation to an employer’s obligation
to provide a reasonable accommodation besides the undue hardship limit. . . . [S]ome
accommodations are ‘unreasonable’ even though they do not cause an undue hardship to the
employer.” Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disability Act, 47 GA.
L. REV. 527, 544–46 (2013).
163. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02.
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (2019).
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a religious adherent different from other employees. Thus, an employer
considering how to make a disabled worker the same as other employees
does not have nearly the same motive to punish the accommodation seeker
as does an employer considering how to make a religious worker different
from other employees. For this reason, it is more necessary to assess how
an accommodation affects a religious-accommodation seeker’s terms and
conditions of employment.
B.

Title VII’s Legislative History

Title VII’s legislative history is not especially helpful in elucidating
Congress’s intent behind the statute’s religious discrimination provisions.
The record corresponding to the religious accommodation amendment is
especially scant, spanning just two pages of the Congressional Record and
consisting mostly of a floor debate in which Senator Randolph, the
amendment’s sponsor, expressed his views on the proposed legislation
and answered four questions from two senators.165 Nothing in the
legislative history suggests Congress considered the meaning of
reasonableness, as the term does not appear anywhere in the record.166 But
what is clear from the record is that Senator Randolph’s singular focus in
proposing the amendment was “to assure that freedom from religious
discrimination in the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by
law.”167 He explained how his concern stemmed from the refusal of
employers to hire or retain workers whose religious beliefs, like his own,
prohibited them from performing work on their Sabbath.168 In his view,
“the law flowing from the original Constitution of the United States
should protect [workers’] religious freedom, and hopefully their
opportunity to earn a livelihood within the American system . . . .”169
Senator Randolph was so focused on protecting workers that at no point
during his speech did he even acknowledge the possibility that an
accommodation could adversely affect an employer.170 Given his zealous

165. 118 CONG. REC. 705–14 (1972); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
74–75 & n.9 (1977) (noting the “brief legislative history” of the 1972 Act, “consist[ing] chiefly of a
brief floor debate in the Senate, contained in less than two pages of the Congressional Record and
consisting principally of the views of . . . Senator Jennings Randolph,” who “expressed his general
desire ‘to assure that freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all
time guaranteed by law,’ but . . . made no attempt to define the precise circumstances under which
the ‘reasonable accommodation’ requirement would be applied”).
166. 118 CONG. REC. 705–14 (1972).
167. Id. at 705.
168. Id. at 705–06.
169. Id. at 706.
170. Id. at 705–06.
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advocacy for the religious rights of employees, it is logically consistent
that by “reasonably accommodate,” Senator Randolph meant an
accommodation’s reasonableness must be assessed from the employee’s
point of view.
There is one other aspect of the legislative history that may shed light
on what Congress meant by reasonable accommodation. At the conclusion
of Senator Randolph’s remarks, a fellow senator posed this hypothetical:
“A young man . . . works 15 days on and then is off 15 days. Would the
amendment require an employer to change that kind of employment ratio
around, so that he would have to work a customary 5- or 6-day week?”171
Senator Randolph replied, “I do not believe that an undue hardship would
come to such an employer.”172 New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams
likewise couched the employer’s accommodation duty in terms of undue
hardship rather than reasonableness during the floor debate, posing the
question to Senator Randolph:
[W]here the employment is such that the job has to be done on a
day that a person under his faith would make his religious
observations, it might be an undue hardship to close down the
operation to accommodate that person. . . . Certainly the
amendment would permit the employer not to hire a person who
could not work on one of the 2 days of the employment; this
would be an undue hardship, and the employer’s situation is
protected under the amendment offered by the Senator from West
Virginia, is it not?173
Senator Randolph agreed this would constitute undue hardship.174
What is noteworthy about his responses is that Senator Randolph did not
assess the employer’s duty by whether the accommodation would be
reasonable to the employer but instead by whether it would cause the
employer undue hardship.175 This further suggests Congress intended for
an employer’s accommodation duty to be limited solely by undue
hardship, not by whether the accommodation is reasonable to
the employer.
C.

EEOC Guidance

The statutory text and legislative history are somewhat nebulous
regarding the meaning of reasonable accommodation, but the EEOC
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 706.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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guidance is not. In the earliest versions of its federal regulations on
religious accommodations, which preceded the amendment to Title VII,
reasonableness seemed tied to the notion of undue hardship. The first
version of the regulation required employers “to accommodate to the
reasonable religious needs of employees . . . where such accommodation
can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the
business.”176 The placement of “reasonable” directly before “religious
needs of employees” indicates the EEOC’s view early on was that an
accommodation had to be reasonable to the employer, not the employee.
Given that what the EEOC was proposing—an affirmative obligation to
accommodate—was unprecedented and somewhat radical for its time, it
is not surprising the agency would attempt to placate employers by
assuring them they only had to accommodate employees’ religious needs
that were reasonable.
The following year, the EEOC made significant changes to the wording
of the guidelines. The new version explained that employers must “make
reasonable
accommodations
to
the
religious
needs
of
employees . . . where such accommodations can be made without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”177 The movement of
“reasonable” to in front of “accommodations” instead of “religious needs”
shifted the employer’s duty from one of accommodating “reasonable
religious needs” to making “reasonable accommodations.” But this was
likely a distinction without a difference, as the EEOC further explained
that “the employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship
renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the
employee unreasonable.”178 Once again, the concept of reasonableness is
tied to undue hardship: a reasonable accommodation is one that does not
cause undue hardship to the employer.
The EEOC’s view of reasonableness evolved after Congress amended
Title VII in 1972. Revisions to the federal regulations in 1980 made clear
the EEOC’s position that an accommodation’s reasonableness should be
measured by how it impacts the employee.179 The EEOC explained that in
situations where multiple accommodations are available that would not
cause undue hardship to the employer, “the Commission will determine
whether the accommodation offered [was] reasonable” by considering:
(i) The alternatives for accommodation considered by the
employer or labor organization; and

176.
177.
178.
179.

31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (June 15, 1966) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605).
32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (July 13, 1967) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605).
Id. at 10,298–99.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2) (2019).

Flake (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 10:14 PM

RESTORING REASONABLENESS

1703

(ii) The alternatives for accommodation, if any, actually offered
to the individual requiring accommodation. Some alternatives for
accommodating religious practices might disadvantage the
individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities,
such as compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Therefore, when there is more than one means of
accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the
employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which
least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her
employment opportunities.180
The EEOC’s position is unequivocal: reasonableness depends on how
an accommodation impacts the employee—not the employer. The
regulation seems to acknowledge that an accommodation may be
reasonable even if it negatively affects the employee’s employment if it is
the only accommodation available that would not cause the employer
undue hardship. But where multiple accommodations are available, none
of which would cause the employer undue hardship, the accommodation
offered or provided is only reasonable if it is the one that least
disadvantages the employee’s employment opportunities. This obligates
employers to not simply provide any accommodation they choose but to
accommodate employees in the manner that least adversely affects
their employment.
The Supreme Court has cast doubt on the EEOC’s position, noting in
Ansonia that “[t]o the extent that the guideline . . . requires the employer
to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship,
we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
statute.”181 But the Court’s characterization of the guideline overlooks the
nuance of the EEOC’s position. Nowhere in the regulation does the EEOC
claim employees are entitled to their preferred accommodation. In fact,
the Commission has explicitly rejected this proposition elsewhere.182 The
EEOC’s view is that for an accommodation to be reasonable in the first

180. Id.
181. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1986).
182. See COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV(A)(3) (“Where there is more than one
reasonable accommodation that would not pose an undue hardship, the employer is not obliged to
provide the accommodation preferred by the employee.”). The EEOC illustrates this position using
the following example:
Tina, a newly hired part-time store cashier whose sincerely held religious belief is that she should
refrain from work on Sunday as part of her Sabbath observance, asked her supervisor never to
schedule her to work on Sundays. Tina specifically asked to be scheduled to work Saturdays
instead. In response, her employer offered to allow her to work on Thursday, which she found
inconvenient because she takes a college class on that day. Even if Tina preferred a different
schedule, the employer is not required to grant Tina’s preferred accommodation.
Id.
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place, it must be less burdensome to the employee than any available
alternative.183 Thus, an employer’s obligation to provide the least
disadvantageous accommodation is not a matter of preference but
of reasonableness.
Rather than alter its guidance in light of Ansonia’s rebuke, the EEOC
has doubled down, explaining in its Compliance Manual:
Although an employer never has to provide an accommodation
that would pose an undue hardship, . . . the accommodation that
is provided must be a reasonable one. An accommodation is not
reasonable if it merely lessens rather than eliminates the conflict
between religion and work, provided eliminating the conflict
would not impose an undue hardship. Eliminating the conflict
between a work rule and an employee’s religious belief, practice,
or observance means accommodating the employee without
unnecessarily disadvantaging the employee’s terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.
Where there is more than one reasonable accommodation that
would not pose an undue hardship, the employer is not obliged to
provide the accommodation preferred by the employee. However,
an employer’s proposed accommodation will not be reasonable if
a more favorable accommodation is provided to other employees
for non-religious purposes, or, for example, if it requires the
employee to accept a reduction in pay rate or some other loss of a
benefit or privilege of employment and there is an alternative
accommodation that does not do so.
Ultimately, reasonableness is a fact-specific determination. The
reasonableness of an employer’s attempt at accommodation
cannot be determined in a vacuum. Instead, it must be determined
on a case‑by‑case basis; what may be a reasonable
accommodation for one employee may not be reasonable for
another . . . . The term reasonable accommodation is a relative
term and cannot be given a hard and fast meaning; each
case . . . necessarily depends upon its own facts and
circumstances, and comes down to a determination of
reasonableness under the unique circumstances of the individual
employer-employee relationship.184
To the EEOC, reasonableness and undue hardship are separate
inquiries, with the former being assessed from the employee’s perspective
and the latter from the employer’s point of view. The EEOC’s current
stance, which has evolved significantly from its initial position, is that an
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2).
184. Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
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accommodation is reasonable only if it fully eliminates the conflict
between the employee’s job and religious beliefs and is the least
burdensome option available to the employee.
D.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed if and how
reasonableness differs from undue hardship in the religious
accommodation context, its jurisprudence supports the notion that these
terms have distinct and independent meanings. While Hardison is best
known for its definition of undue hardship, it also offers a glimpse into
the Supreme Court’s understanding of the relationship between
reasonableness and undue hardship.185 The Court explained that Title VII
requires “an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’ to make ‘reasonable
accommodations’ to the religious needs of its employees.”186 This
suggests the Court saw reasonableness and undue hardship as distinct
concepts since it recognized an employer must make a reasonable
accommodation when undue hardship is not present. Because the Court
found that accommodating Hardison would cause TWA undue
hardship,187 it did not expound on what makes an accommodation
reasonable, nor did it offer any guidance as to whether reasonableness
should be evaluated from the perspective of the employer or the employee.
Justice Marshall hinted in his dissent that reasonableness differs from
undue hardship and should be evaluated from the employee’s
perspective.188 He explained that certain accommodations Hardison
proposed “would have disadvantaged [him] to some extent, but since he
suggested both options” it was unnecessary to “consider whether an
employer would satisfy his duty to accommodate by offering these
choices to an unwilling employee.”189 Thus, Justice Marshall was not only
concerned by how an accommodation would affect the employer but also
by how it would impact the employee. Although the facts of the case did
not allow him to fully explore this question, he seemed to be setting the
stage for another day.
Ansonia provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the
reasonableness question that eluded it in Hardison.190 As previously
discussed, the Court rejected the notion an accommodation is per se
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 96 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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reasonable if it allows the employer to keep his job and practice his
faith.191 Remaining employed is necessary but insufficient for an
accommodation to be reasonable. The Court explained that aside from the
fact that the school board’s unpaid leave policy eliminated the conflict
between Philbrook’s job and his religious beliefs, the accommodation was
reasonable because it had “no direct effect upon either employment
opportunities or job status,” as it appeared he would not be compensated
for just three of his absences each year.192 This indicates that if the
accommodation had affected Philbrook’s employment opportunities or
job status, it may not have been reasonable.
Ansonia provided Justice Marshall the opportunity to expound further
on the concept of reasonableness. He agreed with the majority that if an
employer offers an accommodation that “fully resolves the conflict
between” the employee’s job and religion, it normally has no duty to
consider the employee’s preferred accommodation.193 But if the
employer’s proposed accommodation fails to fully resolve the conflict, he
argued, the employer must consider whatever reasonable proposal the
employee submits.194 Justice Marshall disagreed that the school board’s
policy fully resolved the conflict between Philbrook’s job and religion.195
Although it allowed him to keep his job despite missing work for religious
holidays, Philbrook nonetheless was “force[d] . . . to choose between
following his religious precepts with a partial forfeiture of salary and
violating these precepts for work with full pay.”196 Because “[a] forced
reduction in compensation based on an employee’s religious beliefs can
be . . . a violation of Title VII,” Justice Marshall reasoned, Philbrook was
entitled “to further accommodation, if reasonably possible without undue
hardship to the school board’s educational program.”197 He further
explained that although “unpaid leave will generally amount to a
reasonable accommodation, . . . this does not mean that unpaid leave will
always be the reasonable accommodation which best resolves the conflict
between the needs of the employer and employee.”198 In his view, if an
employee offers another reasonable proposal that results in a more
effective resolution for the employee without causing undue hardship to

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See supra section II.B.
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 72–73 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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the employer, the employer should be required to implement it.199 Justice
Marshall thus would have remanded the case for factual findings on “the
reasonableness and expected hardship of Philbrook’s proposals.”200
Taken together, Hardison and Ansonia support the view that
reasonableness and undue hardship are analytically distinct. In Hardison,
the Court focused on how the proposed accommodations would have
impacted the employer.201 It rightly couched its analysis in terms of undue
hardship because its concern centered on the burden the employer would
have suffered if required to accommodate the employee.202 The Court did
not address the question of reasonableness, not because the presence of
undue hardship rendered the accommodations unreasonable but because
the accommodations failed to clear this first hurdle. Whether the
accommodations were reasonable to Hardison was of no import because
each would have imposed undue hardship on the employer. By contrast,
Ansonia makes almost no mention of undue hardship; the Court’s focus
was not on how the school board would have been affected through the
proposed accommodations but on how Philbrook would be impacted by
the board’s offer of unpaid leave.203 Thus, the Court appropriately
centered its analysis on the question of reasonableness rather than undue
hardship. If reasonableness and undue hardship were two sides of the
same coin, the Ansonia Court would have had no need to consider how
the accommodation impacted Philbrook. It would have instead focused on
whether the accommodation would cause the school board undue
hardship. The fact that it considered the accommodation’s impact on
Philbrook—with no mention of undue hardship—supports the view that
reasonableness and undue hardship are distinct concepts requiring
distinct analyses.
E.

Lower Court Decisions

A number of appellate courts have acknowledged the need to evaluate
an accommodation from the employee’s perspective. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was the first to take this position. In American Postal
Workers Union, San Francisco Local v. Postmaster General,204 two postal
service window clerks who objected on religious grounds to processing
draft registration forms sued the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) for failing to
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 60 (majority opinion).
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77–85 (1977).
Id.
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70.
781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986).
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accommodate their request to refer draft registrants to another window
clerk.205 USPS only offered to allow the clerks to transfer to a different
position that did not require them to process registration forms.206 This
frustrated the clerks because they felt a transfer “would place them in a
less attractive employment status.”207 The district court concluded the
transfer offer removed the religious conflict facing the clerks but did not
consider how it would impact their employment beyond that.208 The Ninth
Circuit held this was an error, explaining that Title VII “requires an
employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee in a
manner which will reasonably preserve that employee’s employment
status, i.e., compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”209 The court viewed the reasonableness inquiry as twopronged: first, the accommodation must eliminate the religious conflict;
and second, it must reasonably preserve the affected employee’s
employment status.210 The court remanded the case “to determine whether
the accommodation proposed by the Postal Service reasonably preserved
the employment status” of the clerks.211
The Sixth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead. In Cooper v. Oak
Rubber Co.,212 the court held that a scheduling accommodation that would
have required the employee to use all of her vacation days was not a
reasonable accommodation even though it technically would have
eliminated the conflict between her job and her religion.213 The court
acknowledged that requiring an employee to use a portion of her vacation
entitlement “may be reasonable” under appropriate circumstances.214 But
forcing the employee to use all of her vacation leave was unreasonable
because the “employee stands to lose a benefit, vacation time, enjoyed by

205. Id. at 774.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 776.
208. Id. at 777.
209. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 776–77 (“Where an employer proposes an accommodation which effectively eliminates
the religious conflict faced by a particular employee, however, the inquiry under Title VII reduces to
whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected employee’s employment status.”). The
Ninth Circuit applied this same test in Kelly v. County of Orange, where it concluded a job transfer
eliminated the conflict between the employee’s job and religion and reasonably preserved the terms
and conditions of her employment because she retained her job title, received a pay increase, requested
and received a decrease in hours, and “her new job was appropriate for a nurse with some degree of
experience and training.” 101 F. App’x 206, 207 (9th Cir. 2004).
211. APWU, 781 F.2d at 777.
212. 15 F.3d 1375 (6th Cir. 1994).
213. Id. at 1379.
214. Id.
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all other employees who do not share the same religious conflict, and is
thus discriminated against with respect to a privilege of employment.”215
In Cosme v. Henderson,216 the Second Circuit assessed the
reasonableness of USPS’s offers to accommodate a letter carrier who
could not work Saturdays for religious reasons by allowing him to remain
an “unassigned regular” employee or to transfer to any of three different
Manhattan locations where he would not have to work Saturdays.217
Citing to Ansonia, the court explained that even though these offers
eliminated the conflict between the employee’s work and religion, the
proposed accommodation “might still have been unreasonable if it caused
Cosme to suffer an inexplicable diminution in his employee status or
benefits. In other words, an accommodation might be unreasonable if it
imposes a significant work-related burden on the employee without
justification . . . .”218 The court concluded that the accommodations
offered were reasonable because the employee had not proven he would
suffer any prejudice if he remained an unassigned regular: he would be
assigned tasks appropriate for a letter carrier, his pay rate would remain
the same, and although he would have temporarily lost his seniority for
ninety days had he transferred locations, there was no evidence this would
have adversely affected his employment.219
The Seventh Circuit has likewise recognized that an accommodation’s
reasonableness depends on how it affects the employee. In Porter v. City
of Chicago,220 an employee requested Sundays off to attend morning
church services.221 The Seventh Circuit rejected the employee’s claim that
her employer’s offer to allow her to switch to a later shift on Sundays was
an unreasonable accommodation, citing one of its prior decisions for the
proposition that “it is a reasonable accommodation to permit an employee
to exercise the right to seek job transfers or shift changes, particularly
when such changes do not reduce pay or cause loss of benefits.”222 The
court concluded that because the employee’s objection to the shift change
was not based on any decrease in her pay or benefits but was instead
simply a matter of preference, the accommodation was reasonable.223 Had
the accommodation resulted in a pay decrease, the outcome may have
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 159–60 (citation omitted).
Id. at 159–61.
700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 952 (quoting Rodriguez v. City of Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Id.
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been different. The court warned that “[h]ad changing watch groups
affected Porter’s pay or other benefits, a much more rigorous inquiry
would be required,” but it did not explain what such inquiry
would entail.224
Several district courts have followed these appellate courts’ lead in
evaluating reasonableness from the employee’s perspective.225 For
example, in O’Barr v. UPS, Inc.,226 UPS offered a mechanic who
requested Saturdays off a part-time position as a preloader that would
have eliminated the conflict with his observance of the Sabbath.227 This
was an entry-level position that did not involve use of his mechanic skills,
which meant a loss of seniority, a reduction in benefits, and a pay decrease
from $30.25 per hour to $9.50 per hour.228 The court denied UPS summary
judgment, explaining that “[t]he focus of the inquiry as to what type of
accommodation is ‘reasonable’ is on whether the accommodation
preserves the employee’s terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment, once the employer has eliminated the religious conflict with
the employee’s requirements.”229 Because the part-time position would
have resulted in a loss of pay and reduction in other benefits, a factual
dispute remained as to whether the accommodation was reasonable under

224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Farah v. A-1 Careers, No. 12-2692-SAC, 2013 WL 6095118, at *6 (D. Kan. Nov.
20, 2013) (“Eliminating the conflict between a work rule and an employee’s religious belief, practice,
or observance means accommodating the employee without unnecessarily disadvantaging the
employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (quoting COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra
note 92, § 12-IV)); Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, No. 08-CV-4094 (DLI)(LB), 2012 WL 3645776, at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012) (acknowledging that “an accommodation could be unreasonable if it
would cause an ‘inexplicable diminution’ in an employee’s status or benefits,” but holding the
plaintiff could not establish such a diminution based on his conclusory assertions that the
accommodation would affect how his employer perceived him); Tomasino v. St. John’s Univ.,
No. 08-CV-2059 (JG)(ALC), 2010 WL 3721047, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010) (holding that the
employer’s accommodation of the employee’s request to participate in noontime mass by requiring
her to take her paid lunch break at 11:15 a.m. was reasonable as a matter of law because such
arrangement had no direct effect upon either her employment opportunities or job status); Winbush
v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 4:06-cv-00525, 2008 WL 11422562, at *7 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 29,
2008) (granting the employer summary judgment where accommodating the employee’s request to
attend religious classes by allowing her to take unpaid time off for approximately three hours per
week did not adversely affect her employment opportunities or job status); Reed v. UAW, 523 F.
Supp. 2d 592, 600–01 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the employer’s offer to accommodate an
employee who objected to paying union dues on religious grounds by allowing him to pay an
equivalent amount to a charity was reasonable as a matter of law because it did not result in the loss
of any employment benefits).
226. No. 3:11-CV-177, 2013 WL 2243004 (E.D. Tenn. May 21, 2013).
227. Id. at *1–3.
228. Id. at *5.
229. Id. (quoting Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 599).
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the circumstances of the case.230
Similarly, in Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Wireless,231 an installation
technician who converted to the Seventh Day Adventist faith sued his
employer for failing to accommodate his request for Saturdays off.232
AT&T offered to allow him to transfer to a sales position or, alternatively,
to ask other technicians to voluntarily swap shifts with him.233 In
considering the reasonableness of these accommodations, the court was
sensitive to how they would impact the employee’s employment. Citing
American Postal Workers Union and Cosme, it acknowledged “a
reasonable accommodation may require that a company ‘reasonably
preserve that employee’s employment status,’” and further noted that
“[b]ased on its independent review of Title VII’s statutory provisions and
existing case law, . . . reasonable preservation of compensation . . . [is] a
significant aspect of a reasonable accommodation.”234 The court
concluded there was an issue of fact as to whether the job transfer
constituted a reasonable accommodation because it would have reduced
the plaintiff’s annual earnings from approximately $38,000 to $23,000.235
The court nonetheless granted AT&T summary judgment because it
determined the company’s offer to allow the employee to swap shifts with
coworkers, coupled with its willingness to provide him with their work
schedules
and
to
advertise
his
need,
constituted
a
reasonable accommodation.236
These cases make clear there is judicial support for the notion that
reasonableness is a separate requirement from undue hardship, and that it
should be assessed from the employee’s perspective. If an accommodation
only had to be reasonable to the employer, these courts would have had
no reason to consider the impact of an accommodation on an employee’s
wages, vacation benefits, or any other term or condition of employment.
Instead, they would have only assessed whether the accommodation
would cause undue hardship to the employer. That each of these courts
evaluated reasonableness separate and apart from undue hardship, by
considering how the accommodation would affect the employee’s
employment opportunities or job status, indicates at least some courts
consider this a necessary factor in determining whether an employer has
satisfied its duty to accommodate.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at *6.
728 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.P.R. 2010).
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
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In sum, the proposition that a religious accommodation must be
reasonable to the employee finds support in several diverse sources. From
a textual standpoint, including both reasonableness and undue hardship
limitations in Title VII’s religious accommodation provision would be
redundant if both were to be assessed solely from the employer’s
perspective. The legislative history likewise supports this position, as it
reflects an unequivocal intent by Congress to protect employees from
suffering adverse employment consequences because of their religious
beliefs and exclusively couches the employer’s burden in terms of undue
hardship rather than unreasonableness. The EEOC has long interpreted
reasonableness as distinct from undue hardship and has explained that
reasonableness is dependent on how an accommodation impacts the
employee. The Supreme Court has signaled its agreement with this
position, holding in Ansonia that the accommodation was reasonable
because it both eliminated the conflict and had no direct effect on the
employee’s employment opportunities or job status. Several lower courts,
including four federal courts of appeals and numerous district courts, have
acknowledged the need to assess how an accommodation would impact
the employee, independent from its effect on the employer.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING REASONABLENESS
Having made the case that reasonableness is distinct from undue
hardship and must be evaluated from the employee’s perspective, this Part
turns to the question of how to determine whether an accommodation
would be reasonable to the employee. It proposes three requirements:
(1) the accommodation must fully eliminate the conflict between the
employee’s job and religious beliefs, (2) the accommodation cannot cause
the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) the
accommodation must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s
terms or conditions of employment. This Part also considers how religious
accommodations would be impacted if this conceptualization of
reasonableness is adopted.
A.

A Reasonable Accommodation Must Eliminate the Employee’s
Work-Religion Conflict

A threshold requirement for any accommodation to be reasonable is
that it must fully eliminate the conflict between the employee’s job and
religious beliefs.237 This means the employer must accommodate the
237. See Zaheer, supra note 6, at 513 (arguing that “[a]n employer can easily devise any number
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employee in a way that allows the employee to fully observe his religious
convictions without losing his job. For example, if a Latter-day Saint
employee believes it is a sin to work on Sundays, a reasonable
accommodation would require the employer to give the employee the
entire day off. Scheduling the employee for a later shift so he can attend
morning church services or allowing him to work from home would be
unreasonable because the employee would still be forced to work on
Sundays in violation of his religious convictions.
Full accommodation does not require the employer to guarantee that
there will never be a conflict between an employee’s job and religion. It
simply requires the employer to ensure that the employee will not face
such a conflict in situations where it can accommodate the employee
without undue hardship. In the case of the employee who believes it is a
sin to work on Sundays, full accommodation would not require the
employer to ensure the employee will never have to work a Sunday but
only that the employee will not have to work those Sundays when his
absence would not cause the employer undue hardship. For example, if
Super Bowl Sunday is the busiest day of the year for the business, such
that all employees are required to work, the employer would have no duty
to accommodate the employee that day. Thus, an employer’s duty to
accommodate is always limited by whether the accommodation would
cause the employer undue hardship—an inquiry an employer does not
make just once but may revisit as circumstances change. Full
accommodation does not mean insulating an employee from religious
conflict in every conceivable scenario but only in those instances where
the employer could accommodate the employee without undue hardship.
Likewise, full accommodation does not mean an employee will not
suffer any adverse consequence as a result of the accommodation. As the
next two sections discuss, limited adverse consequences may be
permissible. However, any consequences must be work-based rather than
religious, for “once a court holds that an accommodation is reasonable
even if it requires an employee to compromise on his religious beliefs,
that court is in fact stating that religion is a mutable characteristic that an
individual can choose to follow or dismiss at will.”238 Thus, an employee
of ‘accommodations’ that at least superficially eliminate the employee’s religious conflict but in
actuality still leave the employee with a difficult choice between religious duty and work obligations,”
and that “[u]ntil an accommodation ‘fully resolves the conflict between the employee’s work and
religious requirements’ or at least mostly resolves the conflict, the accommodation is of little use to
an employee” (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 72–73 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original))).
238. Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s Failure
to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 464 (2010) (arguing
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may, within reason, experience limited adverse consequences such as
reduced wages as a result of an accommodation, but the employee cannot
be required to compromise his religious beliefs.
Returning to the employee who believes it is a sin to work on Sundays,
fully accommodating him does not require the employer to pay him for
time not worked so he avoids any adverse consequence of the
accommodation. Assuming the employer is unable to allow the employee
to make up the lost time by working an extra shift, giving the employee
the day off without pay would likely constitute a full accommodation
because the consequence he suffers—not receiving wages for time not
worked—affects his work, not his religion. By contrast, if the employer
attempted to accommodate the employee by switching him to a later shift
on Sundays, this would only be a partial, and thus unreasonable,
accommodation because the consequence of the accommodation would
be religious rather than work-based since he would be forced to
compromise his religious beliefs by still having to work on Sundays.
The requirement of full accommodation finds support in the definition
of accommodation itself. Black’s Law Dictionary defines accommodation
as “[t]he act or an instance of making a change or provision for someone
or something; an adaptation or adjustment.”239 “Adapt” means “to make
fit . . . often by modification,”240 and “adjust” means “to bring to a more
satisfactory state: (1) settle, resolve, (2) rectify, to make correspondent or
conformable.”241 Kurtz and Sleeper argue
[t]hese definitions lead to the conclusion that the statute’s use of
“accommodate” obliges employers to meet the needs of the
employees’ religious convictions. The plain meaning of the
phrases, and synonyms used in the definitions . . . all indicate that
the accommodation must eliminate the conflict between work
and religion.242
Moreover, in Ansonia, the Supreme Court equated the term “reasonable
accommodation” with the “acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the

that the accommodation in Ansonia was reasonable because Philbrook was not forced to compromise
his religious beliefs, “[r]ather, the compromise he was required to make was purely secular—lost
pay”).
239. Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 6–7 (11th ed. 2019).
240. Adapt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adapt
[https://perma.cc/R29M-S6NJ].
241. Adjust, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjust
[https://perma.cc/UF4T-WGC7].
242. Janell M. Kurtz & Bradley J. Sleeper, Religion vs. Work: Can Accommodation Fail to
Accommodate?, 23 MIDWEST L.J. 75, 89 (2009).
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employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.”243
Thus, “[b]y definition, any arrangement that does not allow both parties
to achieve their basic objectives—the employee’s desire to fulfill his
religious duty and the employer’s desire to accomplish the work he needs
to get done—does not successfully ‘reconcile’ these competing objectives
or values.”244
The requirement of full accommodation is also consistent with
legislative intent, as well as both the Supreme Court’s and EEOC’s
interpretations of the Title VII’s religious accommodation provision.
Senator Randolph proposed the legislation primarily to protect
Sabbatarians like himself from being forced to work on their day of rest.245
The only way to accomplish this is by fully exempting an employee from
work. Partial accommodation would not suffice because the employee
would still be compelled to choose between their job and their religious
beliefs. The Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in Ansonia,
explaining that the accommodation was reasonable, in part, because it
“eliminate[d] the conflict between employment requirements and
religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious
holy days and require[d] him only to give up compensation for a day that
he did not in fact work.”246 The EEOC has taken an even more aggressive
stance, proclaiming that “[a]n accommodation is not ‘reasonable’ if it
merely lessens rather than eliminates the conflict between religion and
work, provided eliminating the conflict would not impose an
undue hardship.”247
In short, reasonable accommodation requires, at a minimum, that the
employer accommodate the employee in a way that fully eliminates the
conflict between the employee’s job and religious beliefs. Full
accommodation does not mean permanent accommodation—an employer
is free to revisit whether an accommodation would impose undue hardship
whenever circumstances change. Nor does full accommodation require an
employer to insulate the employee from any adverse effect, so long as the
consequence is work-based rather than religious. While more should be
required to make an accommodation reasonable, as the next two sections
explain, fully eliminating the conflict between an employee’s job and
religion is an important starting point.
243. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr.
Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145–46 (5th Cir. 1982)).
244. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 37, Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544 (10th Cir.
2018) (No. 16-4135), 2016 WL 6092230 (emphasis in original).
245. See Kaminer, supra note 29, at 584.
246. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added).
247. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV(A)(3).
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A Reasonable Accommodation Must Not Result in an Adverse
Employment Action

A second requirement for an accommodation to be reasonable is that it
must not cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action.
Only discrimination that results in an adverse employment action is
actionable under Title VII.248 The statute does not define “adverse
employment action,” and there is some disagreement among the courts as
to the types of actions that qualify.249 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
adopted the most restrictive test, holding that only “ultimate employment
actions” such as hiring, firing, demoting, and promoting constitute
adverse employment actions.250 The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits take a more expansive view, recognizing actions such
as unwarranted negative performance evaluations, taking away lunch
breaks, and moving an employee to a less desirable workspace as adverse
employment actions.251 The Second and Third Circuits take an
intermediate position, holding that an adverse action is something that
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.252
Regardless of how the term is defined, an accommodation that causes
an employee to suffer an adverse employment action cannot be reasonable
for the simple reason that such an accommodation would itself constitute

248. See Braxton v. Nortek Air Sols., LLC, 769 F. App’x 600, 603 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that a
Title VII plaintiff must prove he suffered an adverse employment action); Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 106
F. App’x 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A title VII plaintiff may recover only if the challenged
employment decision rises to the level of an ‘adverse employment action . . . .’” (quoting Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997))).
249. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–42 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing circuit split on
what constitutes an adverse employment action).
250. Morris v. Baton Rouge City Constable’s Off., 761 F. App’x 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2019) (“For
purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim, ‘[a]dverse employment actions include only ultimate
employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.’”
(quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam))); Ledergerber
v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Title VII claim because “[w]hile the action
complained of may have had a tangential effect on [the plaintiff’s] employment, it did not rise to the
level of an ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII”).
251. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 (first citing Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994); then
citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996); then citing Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Grp., 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996); then citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
1996); then citing Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998); and then citing
Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
252. See Rodriguez-Coss v. Barr, 776 F. App’x 717, 718 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a Title VII
plaintiff must show she “suffered an adverse employment action, defined as a ‘materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment’” (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch.
Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015))); Paradisis v. Englewood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 680 F. App’x 131,
136 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because the
employer’s action “had no impact on the terms of [the plaintiff’s] employment”).
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impermissible discrimination because the employer would be taking such
action because of religion—a violation of Title VII in and of itself.253
Suppose a grocery store clerk requests for religious reasons to be excused
from selling pornographic magazines to customers, and the employer
responds by demoting the employee to a custodial position that pays onethird of the employee’s hourly rate. Despite technically eliminating the
conflict between the employee’s job and religious convictions, the
accommodation would be unreasonable because it would cause the
employee to suffer an adverse employment action. Although the employee
triggered the discrimination and therefore brought it upon herself by
requesting an accommodation, this does not change the fact she suffered
an adverse employment action because of her religion.
By contrast, an accommodation that negatively impacts the terms or
conditions of an employee’s employment but does not rise to the level of
an adverse employment action could potentially constitute a reasonable
accommodation. Suppose a customer service representative asserts a
religious objection to her employer’s requirement that she receive a flu
shot. Requiring the worker to wear a paper mask over her face may
amount to a reasonable accommodation, both because it would eliminate
the conflict by allowing the employee to keep her job and practice her
religion, and because the consequence the employee would experience,
though perhaps unpleasant, would not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action.254 Similarly, an accommodation that requires an
employee like Philbrook to take unpaid leave to observe holy days would
ordinarily be reasonable even though the employee receives a smaller
paycheck because, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the employee is
merely not being paid for time not worked.255
The requirement that an accommodation not cause an adverse
employment action may seem so obvious it is unnecessary to include it as
a component of reasonable accommodation. But in reality, most courts
have not recognized this requirement, at least explicitly, and without it an
employer would be free to fashion any accommodation it wishes no matter
how onerous the consequences, so long as the employee remains
employed. Ensuring an employee does not suffer an adverse employment
action in the course of accommodation is thus essential to the concept
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s . . . religion.”).
254. See Rene F. Najera & Dorit R. Reiss, First Do No Harm: Protecting Patients Through
Immunizing Health Care Workers, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 363, 387 (2016) (suggesting that requiring
an employee to wear a mask would be a reasonable accommodation).
255. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
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of reasonableness.
C.

A Reasonable Accommodation Must Not Unnecessarily
Disadvantage the Employee

The final requirement for an accommodation to be reasonable is that it
must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s terms or conditions
of employment. This means the employer must select the method of
accommodation that least burdens the employee’s employment without
causing the employer undue hardship. Suppose a restaurant server
requests to no longer work evening shifts so she can attend religious
services. The employer has openings on its morning and afternoon shifts
and could move the server to either shift without undue hardship. The
employee requests the morning shift because the tip amounts she would
earn in the mornings would be comparable to what she earned in the
evenings, whereas she would earn considerably fewer tips on the
afternoon shift. If the employer transfers the employee to the afternoon
shift, when it could have moved her to the morning shift without undue
hardship, the accommodation would be unreasonable because it would
unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s employment by causing a
reduction in her wages that was avoidable.
This requirement is consistent with the EEOC’s interpretation of
reasonable accommodation. When the EEOC updated the federal
regulations in 1980, it included a provision asserting that it would
determine the reasonableness of an accommodation by considering the
alternatives for accommodation considered by the employer and offered
to the employee.256 Recognizing that “[s]ome alternatives . . . might
disadvantage the individual with respect to his or her employment
opportunities,” the EEOC explained that “when there is more than one
means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the
employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which least
disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment
opportunities.”257 The EEOC reaffirmed this position in its Compliance
Manual, explaining that reasonable accommodation “means
accommodating the employee without unnecessarily disadvantaging the
employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and warning
that “an employer’s proposed accommodation will not be
‘reasonable’ . . . if it requires the employee to accept a reduction in pay
rate or some other loss of a benefit or privilege of employment and there

256. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (2019).
257. Id.
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is an alternative accommodation that does not do so.”258
Requiring an employer to not unnecessarily disadvantage an
accommodation seeker is not the same as mandating that an employer
provide the accommodation seeker’s preferred accommodation. The
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the latter in Ansonia, and in doing so
noted that “[t]o the extent that the [EEOC] guideline . . . requires the
employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of
undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the statute.”259 This does not mean the Supreme Court opposed
the EEOC’s view that a reasonable accommodation must not
unnecessarily disadvantage the employee. The EEOC has since explained
that “[t]he Commission’s guidelines do not require an employer to accept
any alternative favored by the employee, and, thus, are not inconsistent
with Ansonia.”260 The Commission has further noted that “the Court in
Ansonia recognized that the limitation in the Commission’s guidelines—
that alternatives must be considered if they will not ‘disadvantage an
individual’s
employment
opportunities’—distinguished
the
Commission’s position from the position of the Second Circuit that was
rejected in Ansonia.”261 While it is true that in most cases employees will
prefer the accommodation option that least disadvantages their
employment, the concepts of unnecessary disadvantage and preference
are analytically distinct. The reasonableness inquiry focuses on how an
accommodation affects an employee’s employment relative to the
alternatives—not the employee’s preference.
Requiring employers to provide the least burdensome accommodation
would extend meaningful protection to accommodation seekers at little or
no cost to employers. Because an employer never has to provide an
accommodation that would cause it more than a de minimis burden,
requiring the employer to provide one type of accommodation that
essentially costs it nothing instead of another accommodation that would
likewise cost it nothing should make little, if any, difference to the
employer. Either way, the employer is protected from incurring virtually
any hardship. While this would result in employers sometimes having less
say over how employees are accommodated because they would be
required to select the least disadvantageous accommodation, the deck
remains stacked so heavily in favor of employers that even with this added
requirement they would continue to wield significant control over the

258.
259.
260.
261.

COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV.A.3.
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69 n.6.
COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV.A.3 n.133.
Id.
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religious accommodation process.
D.

Potential Implications

This Article argues for the restoration of reasonableness to workplace
religious accommodations. The goal is to realign religious
accommodation jurisprudence with congressional intent that in the
absence of undue hardship, employers should provide employees with
accommodations that protect them from having to make the “cruel choice”
between their jobs and their religious convictions.262 Accommodations
that merely allow employees to keep their jobs but adversely impact their
employment in other ways may force employees into the precise dilemma
Congress sought to prevent. Requiring accommodations that fully
eliminate the work-religion conflict, do not result in adverse employment
action, and do not unnecessarily disadvantage the accommodation
seeker’s terms or conditions of employment is a potentially powerful way
to ensure employees are not needlessly forced to choose between their
jobs and their religious beliefs.
Accommodation seekers certainly stand to benefit the most from this
proposal. The likelihood of receiving an accommodation probably would
not increase, since employers would still hold the ultimate trump card—
undue hardship—allowing them to continue denying most
accommodation requests. Yet the quality of accommodations would
improve in many instances. This proposal would end the practice of partial
accommodation, as employers could no longer offer accommodations that
do not fully eliminate the conflict between an employee’s job and
religious beliefs. It would likewise guarantee an employee would not
suffer an adverse employment action, such as a demotion or substantial
pay decrease, because of an accommodation. And although employees
would not be entitled to their preferred accommodations, they could rest
assured that employers that can accommodate them without undue
hardship must provide accommodations that do not unnecessarily
disadvantage their terms or conditions of employment. Taken together,
these requirements would offer meaningful protection to accommodation
seekers that would allow them to adhere to their religious beliefs while
reasonably preserving their employment status.
As beneficial as this proposal may be for employees, there is some risk
it might actually result in fewer accommodations. By raising the bar for
reasonableness, it may become even easier for an employer to claim undue
hardship. For instance, an employer may not be able to give an employee
who believes it is a sin to work on Sundays the entire day off without
262. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Flake (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 10:14 PM

RESTORING REASONABLENESS

1721

undue hardship but may be able to allow the employee to work a shorter
shift in order to at least attend church services on Sunday mornings. Under
this proposal, the accommodation the employer could offer would only
partially eliminate the work-religion conflict and therefore would not be
reasonable. Because the employer could not provide an accommodation
that meets this heightened standard for reasonableness without suffering
undue hardship itself, it may choose instead not to offer any
accommodation at all, arguably leaving the employee worse off because
he would not even get Sunday mornings off.
There are at least three responses to this concern. First, for many
religious workers, adherence to their beliefs is an all-or-nothing
proposition, not a matter of compromise.263 It might not be any
consolation for the employee opposed to working on Sundays to be
offered part of the day off to attend church, or for an employee who is
required to pray five times a day to be permitted to pray three times. Thus,
it is not necessarily true that an employee would be worse off by receiving
no accommodation than by receiving an unreasonable accommodation: In
both instances the employee is being forced to violate his religion.
Second, if raising the bar for reasonableness were to result in fewer
accommodations, the fault would lie with how undue hardship, not
reasonableness, is defined. The obvious solution would be to raise the
undue hardship standard instead of lowering the reasonableness
requirement. If this proposal were to result in fewer accommodations,
perhaps this would generate the pressure necessary for Congress to finally
pass the Workplace Religious Freedom Act or other legislation
heightening the undue hardship standard. Third, in the absence of
legislative action, courts could incentivize employers to offer employees
the most effective accommodation they can without suffering undue
hardship, even if the accommodation does not meet the new standard for
reasonableness. Acceptance of such an accommodation by an employee
would constitute waiver of any potential claim against the employer for
failure to accommodate. The carrot of immunity could incentivize many
employers to offer the best accommodation possible, thus allowing
employees to choose for themselves whether some accommodation is
better than none.
One strength of this proposal is that it would benefit employees without
any real cost to employers. As long as the undue hardship standard
remains in place, employers would continue to be able to deny any
263. See Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 55,
86 (2006) (“Religious belief systems are rigid, all or nothing, frameworks. All religious obligations
must be obeyed, and they can only be satisfied through literal compliance with the tenets of one’s
faith.”).
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accommodation that is even minimally burdensome. Thus, the net burden
of accommodation on employers would remain virtually unchanged.
Under this proposal, an employer might have to provide an
accommodation that is different from the one it prefers. But because
neither accommodation would impose more than a de minimis burden, the
difference between what the employer prefers and what is required would
be negligible.264 Moreover, any cost the employer would incur through
this proposal would easily be offset by two benefits they would potentially
reap because of it. First, employees accommodated in accordance with
this proposal would be less likely to bring religious discrimination claims
against their employers.265 Even if they did file suit, employers would be
better positioned to defend themselves by showing they considered
options for accommodation not only from their own perspective but also
from the employee’s.266 And second, more employee-friendly
accommodations would likely boost employee morale, leading to greater
productivity, creativity, loyalty, and profitability.267
264. In the case of the restaurant server who requests to be accommodated by transferring to the
morning shift instead of the afternoon shift (so she could earn comparable wages), the employer would
have to make this accommodation even though it prefers to move her to the afternoon shift, if
transferring her to the afternoon shift would be unnecessarily disadvantageous to the employee. See
supra section IV.C. But if placing the server on the morning shift instead of the afternoon shift would
be even minimally burdensome to the employer, it would have no obligation to do so.
265. See Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom in the New
Millennium, 51 ME. L. REV. 341, 357 (1999) (arguing that “the number of lawsuits will likely decrease
as employers grow ever more accommodating of employee beliefs and practices”).
266. See Flake, supra note 80, at 70 (arguing that employers that solicit an accommodation seeker’s
input and give due consideration to the employee’s preferred accommodation will be better positioned
to defend themselves in the event of litigation).
267. See JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH
IMPACT 2–4 (2019), https://askjan.org/publications/TopicDownloads.cfm?pubid=962628&action=d
ownload&pubtype=pdf [https://perma.cc/5DP3-UBSV] (study of nearly 2,400 employers found that
providing accommodations to disabled employees resulted in retention of valuable employees,
improved productivity and morale, a reduction in workers’ compensation and training costs, and
improved company diversity); DAVID BOWLES & CARY COOPER, EMPLOYEE MORALE: DRIVING
PERFORMANCE IN CHALLENGING TIMES 9 (2009) (explaining that an employee’s perception of
fairness and equity factors heavily into employee morale); Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens:
Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect Coworker Morale, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 176–77
(2015) (reviewing the literature on how high-morale workplaces enjoy stronger financial
performance, greater productivity, better attendance, less stress, lower accident rates, and greater
employee retention); Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Workplace Spirituality and Organizational
Performance, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 355, 361–62 (2003) (concluding that spirituality in the workplace
allows businesses to meet their profit-making goals by helping employees feel happier, more creative,
and more connected to the work community); Fahri Karakas, Spirituality and Performance in
Organizations: A Literature Review, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 89, 94–97 (2010) (“There is growing evidence
in spirituality research that workplace spirituality programs result in positive individual level
outcomes for employees such as increased joy, serenity, job satisfaction, and commitment. There is
also evidence that these programs improve organizational productivity and reduce absenteeism and
turnover.” (citations omitted)).
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This proposal would also bring clarity to an area of law riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions. Confusion over whether
reasonableness should be assessed from the employer’s or the employee’s
perspective would be eliminated, as would questions about whether
Title VII requires full or partial accommodation, or whether an
accommodation can be reasonable even if it results in an adverse
employment action. And while courts would have the added task in some
cases of determining whether an accommodation unnecessarily
disadvantages the employee’s employment, this inquiry would be limited
to the relatively few cases where multiple accommodations are available.
Even then, determining whether one accommodation would be more
disadvantageous to the employee than another does not seem an especially
difficult or time-consuming undertaking.
Beyond these benefits, reconceptualizing reasonableness would be
normatively consequential. Because law has both instrumental and
symbolic value,268 “how it is implemented send[s] messages about who
counts as equal members of the political community and what
fundamental moral principles define that community.”269 In this case,
Congress long ago made a value judgment that when possible, employees
should be protected from having to choose between their jobs and their
religious beliefs. While religious accommodation jurisprudence has
stripped the law of much of its force,270 this conceptualization of
reasonableness would go far in signaling that religious freedom remains a
value worth protecting.
CONCLUSION
Despite Title VII’s plain language—and equally clear legislative
intent—that an employee is entitled to a reasonable religious
accommodation in the absence of undue hardship to the employer, courts
have whittled away at this right to the point it is practically nonexistent.
268. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993) (arguing that law has both instrumental
and symbolic value); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 398 (1997) (“[L]aw also expresses normative principles and
symbolizes societal values, and these moralizing features may affect behavior.”).
269. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore Richard
Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 79, 93 (2011).
270. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination
Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 862 n.7 (2004) (observing that “Title VII’s religious accommodation
requirement is generally viewed as fairly toothless”); J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1399–400 (2003) (“Unlike
the toothless duty to accommodate employees’ religious practices that is contained in Title VII, [the
ADA’s disability accommodation] provision has real bite.”).
IN THE
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Employees today have little say over if or how they are accommodated,
as courts have made this almost exclusively the employer’s domain. To
combat this trend and restore some semblance of balance, this Article
proposes a reconceptualization of reasonableness that has the potential to
strengthen the quality of religious accommodations for employees without
unduly burdening employers in the process. Decoupling reasonableness
from undue hardship would allow courts to assess an accommodation’s
reasonableness from the employee’s point of view. No longer could an
employer offer an accommodation without regard for how it might
otherwise impact the employee’s employment. Instead, the employer
would be required to provide an accommodations that fully eliminates the
work-religion conflict, does not cause the employee to suffer an adverse
employment action, and avoid unnecessarily disadvantaging the
employee’s terms or conditions of employment. This would benefit
employees by giving them access to accommodations that would enable
them to perform their jobs without having to compromise their religious
beliefs. Moreover, because an employer never has to provide a religious
accommodation that would cause it more than a de minimis burden, this
proposal would have virtually no adverse impact on employers. If
anything, employers stand to benefit from it. With much to gain and little
to lose, restoring reasonableness to workplace religious accommodations
is a change worth making.

